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For more than a decade, a single rubric for legalization of the 11 million
undocumented people in the United States has dominated every major proposal
for comprehensive immigration reform, and continues to do so today: earned
citizenship. Introduced as a rhetorical move intended to distinguish such pro-
posals from amnesty, the earned citizenship frame has shaped the substantive
provisions of the legislation by conditioning legalization on the performance of
economic, cultural, and civic metrics. In order to regularize status, earned citi-
zenship would require undocumented individuals to demonstrate their ongoing
societal contributions at multiple intervals over a probationary period of many
years, and they would remain subject to deportation for failure to do so. Such a
behavioral approach expresses a particular moral basis for legalization and a
normative vision of citizenship, and it aspires to place millions of people on a
path to citizenship. And yet, despite the centrality of earned citizenship in con-
temporary immigration debates and the magnitude of its ambition, there has
been virtually no scholarly treatment of its substance, ideology, or normative
claims. While the election of Donald Trump has rendered progressive immigra-
tion reform improbable in the next several years, this is all the more reason to
examine the failed logic and structure of recent reform proposals. This Article
explores the origins and illuminates the deep structure of earned citizenship, and
it critically evaluates its virtues and shortcomings as matters of politics, moral-
ity, policy, and law. Although laudable for its inclusionary promise, earned citi-
zenship suffers from serious and previously unaddressed theoretical and
conceptual flaws that reinscribe the moral claims of restrictionists, illuminate
and imperil our larger understandings of citizenship, and invite consideration of
alternative frameworks for legalization. The rightward electoral shift has closed
a window for progressive reform for now, but when it is next pried open, a
different moral and legal framework for legalization may be required.
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For more than a decade, a single rubric for legalization of the 11 million
undocumented people in the United States has dominated every major pro-
posal for comprehensive immigration reform, and continues to do so today:
earned citizenship. Introduced as a rhetorical move intended to distinguish
such proposals from amnesty, the earned citizenship frame has shaped the
substantive provisions of immigration legislation by conditioning legaliza-
tion on the performance of economic, cultural, and civic metrics. In order to
"earn" their citizenship, undocumented individuals would be required to
demonstrate their ongoing societal contributions over a probationary period
of many years, and would remain subject to deportation should they fail.
Such a behavioral approach expresses a particular moral basis for legaliza-
tion and a normative vision of citizenship, and it aspires to place millions of
people on a path to citizenship. And yet, despite the centrality of earned
citizenship in contemporary immigration debates and the magnitude of its
ambition, there has been virtually no scholarly treatment of its substance,
ideology, or normative claims. This Article explores the origins and illumi-
nates the deep structure of earned citizenship, and critically evaluates the
virtues and shortcomings of earned citizenship as matters of politics, moral-
ity, policy, and law. Although laudable for its inclusionary promise, earned
citizenship suffers from serious and previously unaddressed theoretical and
conceptual flaws that reinscribe the moral claims of restrictionists, illumi-
nate and imperil our larger understandings of citizenship, and invite consid-
eration of alternative frameworks for legalization.
A close examination of earned citizenship demonstrates that, while
ideologically heterogeneous, it is predominantly neoliberal and punitive in
orientation; it disciplines the putative citizen through expectations of eco-
nomic productivity and moral self-governance and under threat of various
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sanctions.' The neoliberal and punitive aspects of the framework cast the
undocumented in a deficit position. In doing so, earned citizenship implic-
itly subscribes to the core claim of restrictionists2 - namely, that undocu-
mented immigrants have committed moral transgressions that require some
form of moral recompense. Such an approach is empirically flawed because
it ignores the complex, structural causation of undocumented migration, and
it is conceptually flawed in that it locates legalization within the restriction-
ists' terms of the debate.
However, an examination of earned citizenship is productive not only
to enhance an understanding of recent proposals for legalization, but also to
illuminate the larger structure of prevailing citizenship practices. Earned cit-
izenship begs the question of why some should have to demonstrate their
worthiness for citizenship while, for most, citizenship is conferred merely by
the accident of birth. By highlighting the prevailing practice of unearned
citizenship, earned citizenship exposes the moral instability of the contem-
porary citizenship structure as a whole, and imperils the citizenship claims
of all Americans. Ultimately, mapping these contours of earned citizenship
and its relationship to citizenship more generally may enable the develop-
ment of alternative moral frameworks for justifying and advocating legaliza-
tion of the undocumented population.
Earned citizenship emerged as a reaction to the political fallout of the
last large-scale legalization program, the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 ("IRCA").3 Although that program successfully regularized the
status of approximately three million people, it failed to halt the employment
of undocumented workers or the future flow of undocumented migrants.
4 Its
many shortcomings cast a deep and persistent shadow over future immigra-
tion reform efforts. Derided as an "amnesty" - a something-for-nothing
giveaway that, according to its critics, not only rewarded past law-breaking
but incentivized future immigration violations by implicitly promising future
legalizations - IRCA is the bate noire of immigration reform history. That
reputation has created a political imperative to differentiate future reform
efforts. Earned citizenship is, according to its advocates, "not amnesty."
' The term neoliberalism is used differently in various contexts. David Singh Grewal &
Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2
(2014) ("Neoliberalism is an overlapping set of arguments and premises that are not always
entirely mutually consistent . . ."). As discussed in greater detail below, see infra Section
II.B.1., I use the term here to denote an ideology that premises ocial and political inclusion on
conformity with expectations of economic self-sufficiency and moral self-governance, in a
manner that upholds market values and imperatives, reifies unequal political power, and
marginalizes states as providers and protectors of individual and collective well-being.
2 I use the term restrictionist to describe those who favor imposing substantial limitations
on current levels of immigration and those who oppose any significant legalization program.
Such positions may be based on a variety of economic, cultural, racial, political, and ethical
motivations.
Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3445.
4 See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
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While citizenship via naturalization or previous legalization programs
such as IRCA has long been earned in some sense, in that any substantive
requirements for citizenship could be construed as earnings, the contempo-
rary earned citizenship regime is materially different. The new regime's
foremost focus on earning rationales and requirements renders citizenship as
a prize for performance rather than a status of equality. IRCA sought to
wipe clean the population of undocumented immigrants in one fell swoop,
by quickly converting their status from undocumented to lawful permanent
residents in wholesale fashion. In contrast, earned citizenship front-ends
many naturalization-like requirements and creates a long period of proba-
tionary status for millions of individuals during which these requirements
must be satisfied. Earned citizenship holds out lawful permanent residence
and citizenship thereafter as a capstone achievement for successful societal
contribution and integration. Whereas IRCA was built on a prior under-
standing that lawful permanent residence is preparatory for citizenship as a
basis from which an individual could build the competencies necessary to
naturalize, earned citizenship creates an intermediate, precarious status in
which individuals must perform their economic, civic, and cultural contribu-
tions to the nation before even advancing to lawful permanent residence. As
a result, citizenship is tested more stringently and progressively over a pe-
riod of years. Moreover, unlike IRCA - whose end goal arguably was
lawful permanent residence - earned citizenship is a regime that, as its
name implies, contemplates citizenship, integrates that goal into the regime,
redefines its substantive requirements, and redistributes those requirements
across a lengthy period of performance.
The terminology of earning seeks to shift the discourse of immigration
reform away from the pejorative of reward for bad behavior and toward the
attribute of merit. But the move is not merely rhetorical; unlike IRCA,
which had minimal requirements and a short path to lawful permanent resi-
dence,' earned citizenship proposals construct new and lengthy periods of
probationary lawful residence; impose substantial work, language, and civics
requirements, as well as the payment of fines, as conditions for obtaining
permanent residence; punish the failure to satisfy the probationary terms
with the threat of deportation; and make citizenship unavailable for more
than a decade.6 Earned citizenship regimes thus construct a long, multi-
stage, and precarious pathway to citizenship punctuated by performance
benchmarks that must be met to advance from one station to the next or even
to remain in the same station.
While appealing in many respects for its emphasis on individual merit
and its basic goal of liberal enlargement of the circle of belonging, earned
citizenship is ideologically heterogeneous and conceptually complex. A
close examination of the most robust earned citizenship proposal to date, a
See infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., S. 744, 113th Cong. § 2102 (2013).
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2013 comprehensive immigration reform bill,7 reveals that the framework is
by turns communitarian and assimilationist, but predominantly neoliberal
and penal. Through a system of penalty and reward, earned citizenship
promises to incorporate the undocumented immigrant, but demands eco-
nomic, cultural, and civic conformity in return. The substantive require-
ments of earned citizenship conjure and project an idealized citizen who is,
fundamentally, a neoliberal actor, one who through economic and moral
self-sufficiency is deemed worthy of reward. By conditioning benefits upon
such performance, earned citizenship thus disciplines the previously unruly
immigrant.
The emergence of the earned citizenship regime tracks broader shifts in
the rhetoric, substance, and ideology of social welfare policy. Specifically,
federal welfare reform of the 1990s, which transformed federal assistance to
poor families from an entitlement to a performance-based, "welfare-to-
work" program, anticipates the framework of earned citizenship, which ar-
rived on the scene only a handful of years later. In both cases, provision of a
social good - financial assistance or legal status - is conditioned upon an
individual's satisfaction of neoliberal performance metrics. And in both
cases, those metrics reflect a neoliberal conception of citizenship, whereby
worthiness is measured by economic productivity and moral rectitude.
But the neoliberal aspects of earned citizenship, combined with its pu-
nitive provisions, place undocumented individuals in a starting position of
moral deficit that recapitulates the moral framework of immigration restric-
tionists. Earned citizenship requires each applicant for legalization to
demonstrate that she is worthy of citizenship. Although its political goal is
to incorporate several million individuals into the polity, earned citizenship
begins with the principal argument of immigration restrictionists - namely,
that the large, undocumented population is the product of individual deci-
sions to violate the nation's immigration laws; it is such moral deficit that
necessitates the earning of citizenship by each undocumented person. Thus,
while deeply motivated by the political imperative to differentiate from am-
nesty, earned citizenship nonetheless yokes itself to the logic of amnesty's
central argument. This epistemic error traps earned citizenship within the
discourse of amnesty, and more troublingly ignores the complex causation of
undocumented immigration. Rather than recognize the role that government
acquiescence, private sector incentives, and global economic and govern-
ance developments have played in the production of the large undocumented
population,' earned citizenship reduces the problem to the aggregation of
several million individual, agentic decisions to break the law. Echoing the
social construction of welfare recipients,' this is a pathological understand-
ing of undocumented immigration. Such an "individual responsibility" ap-
7 Id
8 See infra notes 140-48 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 84-107 and accompanying text.
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proach ignores the structural features of migration and unfairly allocates the
entirety of the moral burden for undocumented immigration to immigrants
themselves. Earned citizenship thus imposes individual responsibilities for
collective failures and conceives of citizenship as a reward for good behav-
ior rather than an imperative of equality.
The earning of citizenship, based upon performance metrics, is incom-
patible with an Arendtian understanding of citizenship as a fundamental bul-
wark against societal, territorial, and legal dispossession.0 If we understand
juridical citizenship, or citizenship as status, as an indefeasible claim of be-
longing and concomitant state protection, then from a moral standpoint bar-
riers to citizenship should be low." And yet, earned citizenship pulls in the
opposite direction, as it is by design a far more complex system for citizen-
ship acquisition than previous legalization programs.
A sustained focus on earned citizenship reveals an even deeper concep-
tual difficulty, one which is not internal to the debate over legalization but
rather extends to the larger structure of citizenship. The very notion of
earned citizenship forces consideration of what constitutes unearned citizen-
ship. In fact, for the majority of people in the United States (and the world),
citizenship is unearned. The principal forms of citizenship transmission -
jus sanguinis (citizenship by descent) and jus soli (citizenship by territorial
birth) - ultimately confer citizenship based on the accident of birth. Such a
citizenship regime suffers from a fundamental tension, as citizenship
'0 See generally HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 11-78 (new ed.,
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1966) (1951). Arendt famously defined citizenship as "the
right to have rights," id. at 298, by which she meant that first-order rights such as the right
against deprivation of life or liberty could only be meaningfully secured through membership
in the political community. Understood in these terms, citizenship as political membership is
essential to safeguarding one's humanity.
" Of course, this is hardly the only conception of citizenship. Alternative understandings
focus on citizenship as a right of political participation, a right to social welfare, or a right of
equal membership. For an incisive discussion of competing typologies of citizenship dis-
course, see Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447,
456-88 (2000). Importantly, citizenship can promote national solidarity essential for the pro-
motion of equality. As Hiroshi Motomura writes:
The most persuasive justification for immigration and citizenship laws is that na-
tional borders create bounded societies in which equality and individual dignity can
flourish. Borders foster equality in any society because they reinforce civic solidar-
ity - some sense of bonds among members of a community, some sense of being
involved in a joint enterprise for some common purpose. As political scientist Sarah
Song reminds us, civic solidarity is important for several reasons. It is integral to the
pursuit of distributive justice based on some belief in equal treatment. Mutual trust
is necessary before all members of a society will participate in strengthening it. This
type of trust requires that members believe that other members are like themselves in
some meaningful sense. Civic solidarity is also important for the full sort of democ-
racy that extends beyond voting to meaningful deliberation within a society. Such
genuine democracy requires a concern for the common good. That concern requires
solidarity. And solidarity is the basis for equal treatment.
Hiroshi Motomura, Who Belongs?: Immigration Outside the Law and the Idea of Americans in
Waiting, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REv. 359, 365 (2012) (citing Sarah Song, What Does It Mean to Be
an American? DYEDALUS, Spring 2009, at 31-32).
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promises equality but its distribution is morally arbitrary. By endorsing be-
havioral bases for citizenship acquisition for some but not others, earned
citizenship exacerbates this tension. Such asymmetric application of behav-
ioral requirements to citizenship transmission is morally unstable, and in-
vites pernicious social and political practices in order to justify the
asymmetry.
The predominance of birthright citizenship practices creates an impera-
tive to avoid their moral indictment, even as earned citizenship focuses at-
tention on them. This can be done in at least three ways. First is a process
of moral differentiation, whereby aspiring citizens are demeaned such that
birthright citizens are correspondingly exalted. Earned citizenship's location
of undocumented persons in a place of moral deficit exemplifies this ap-
proach. So, too, are complementary strategies of criminalization and racial-
ization of immigrants, which have the collective effect of debasing the moral
claims of belonging of immigrants. Second, the problem of unearned citi-
zenship could be mitigated through a leveling down of birthright citizenship.
This would involve the importation of behavioral requirements for citizen-
ship into the requirements for birthright citizenship. Such an approach is
evident in the persistent attacks on territorial birthright citizenship, them-
selves grounded in an invented, narrative of the "anchor baby," a quasi-
criminal figure and the object of racial contempt. Similarly, proposals for
citizenship-stripping would impose behavioral requirements on citizens even
after their status was secured, effectively rendering citizenship probationary
rather than a permanent status of equality. Earned citizenship echoes this
approach as well, as it features a lengthy probationary period before citizen-
ship may be secured.
Finally, the problem of unearned citizenship could be addressed
through a leveling up - that is, a liberal program of legalization and natu-
ralization, free of unnecessary performance metrics, so as to narrow the gap
between earned and unearned citizenship. This approach is bedeviled by its
own baseline problem (whom do we let in? whom do we keep out?), but it
avoids the pernicious impulses of the prior two moves. It may not explain
exactly where to draw the line, but it does point in the direction of lower
barriers to entry, rapid incorporation into full citizenship, and the mainte-
nance of citizenship once conferred as an unimpeachable claim of equality.
Despite its inclusionary ambitions, earned citizenship comes at a signif-
icantly regressive cost. Its logic renders earned citizenship complicit in a
faulty and insidious moral economy of demonization and stigma, and it un-
wittingly affirms the morally shaky foundation of unearned citizenship. This
may well be a pragmatic strategy, recalling the insight of Joel Handler and
Yeheskel Hasenfeld that successful political reform of morally complex is-
sues frequently requires a reaffirmation of dominant ideology rather than a
2632017]
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rupture with it.12 But the predominance of the earned citizenship framework
crowds out alternative moral and political claims for legalization that would
focus our attention on the structural causes of undocumented immigration
and the collective moral harm suffered by allowing the persistence of a
large-scale, long-term, racially marked, low-wage population that by law
and social practice is confined to the margins of society. Moreover, the
2016 presidential election suggests that the moral compromise implicit in
earned citizenship was insufficient to overcome the deep-seated "amnesty"
objection to legalization.
Part I of the Article traces the history of the concept of earned citizen-
ship and demonstrates how the political memory of IRCA demanded the
development of an alternative to the notion of legalization as amnesty. Part
II explores the substance of the most recent earned citizenship legislation, a
2013 bill that passed in the Senate but was never voted on in the House, and
articulates its competing ideological underpinnings. It demonstrates the ide-
ological resonance of earned citizenship with welfare reform, and illustrates
how earned citizenship remains trapped within the logic and discourse of
amnesty, such that citizenship is rendered a form of recompense rather than
a form of equality. Part III considers earned citizenship in relation to the
unearned citizenship practices of jus soli and jus sanguinis, and argues that
because earned citizenship is corrosive of these practices, it magnifies the
imperative to preserve them, often in troubling ways. The Article concludes
by arguing that vacating the earned citizenship regime opens an imaginative
space to develop stronger and more coherent moral claims for legalization of
the undocumented population.
I. IMMIGRATION REFORM: FROM AMNESTY To EARNED CITIZENSHIP
Across the political spectrum, the consensus view is that the American
immigration system is broken, as evidenced from the size of the undocu-
mented population in the country today." But this gross diagnosis masks
dramatic differences as to the underlying causes and optimal solutions to the
problem. As with any complex system, there are many moving parts suscep-
tible to intervention and reform. Legalization opponents focus on a large
and semi-permeable Southern border, logistical and technological difficul-
2 
JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY:
WELFARE REFORM IN AMERICA 8 (1991) ("[U]nless political interests can garner broad legiti-
macy through attachment to dominant cultural symbols, they are unlikely to enter the public
agenda.").
" See, e.g., Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Immigration, Nov. 20,
2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/immigration/immigration-action#, archived at
https://perma.cc/635Z-WL32, at 2 (President Obama: "But today, our immigration system is
broken - and everybody knows it."); Paul Ryan, Immigration, http://paulryan.house.gov/is-
sues/issue/?IssuelD= 9970, archived at https://perma.cc/2YZT-V4QX, at 1 ("Our immigration
system is broken, and the evidence is overwhelming. Eleven million undocumented immi-
grants are living in the United States.").
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ties in ensuring that noncitizens on temporary visas depart when their visas
expire, and the willingness of noncitizens to breach American law. 14 Busi-
ness interests highlight the caps on visas for both low-skilled and high-
skilled labor, the cumbersome nature of labor certification processes for em-
ployment-based immigration, and the specific demands for seasonal migrant
labor in the agricultural industry." Immigrants' rights advocates and organ-
ized labor highlight the labor exploitation, social and political exclusion, and
persistent fear of deportation and resulting family separation experienced
daily by some 11 million undocumented people.'" The politics of immigra-
tion are compounded by tensions between nativism and cultural conserva-
tism at one end of the spectrum and multiculturalism at the other, and often
diffuse concerns about national security. To varying degrees, comprehensive
immigration reform legislative proposals of the past decade have credited
nearly all of these causal claims and national interests, and have attempted to
solve them in an omnibus fashion. Earned citizenship likewise seeks to ac-
commodate these competing interests, and it has emerged as a key technol-
ogy in the legislative machinery of comprehensive immigration reform.
An interest group account of the contemporary debate over immigration
identifies five major constituencies in favor of reform: organized labor, busi-
ness, agriculture, Latinx communities,17 and the civil rights community. Le-
galization opponents are more difficult to classify in interest group terms,
and instead reflect a mix of rule-of-law moralism (often conflating civil im-
" See, e.g., Stop Amnesty, NUMBERSUSA, (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.numbersusa.com/
solutions/stop-amnesty, archived at https://perma.cc/6AJS-RDQ2; Mark Metcalf, Immigration
Court Evasions, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (June 12, 2014), http://cis.org/metcalf/immigration-
court-evasions, archived at https://perma.cc/J63N-C292; The Current State of the Border
Fence, FED. FOR AM. IMMIGR. REFORM (Jan. 2017), http://www.fairus.org/issue/us-mexico-bor-
der-fence-and-patrol-operations, archived at http://perma.cc/RMX3-TLLG.
" See, e.g., Marie-Astrid Langer, Silicon Valley Wants High-Skilled Immigration on Cam-
paign Agenda, WALL ST. J.: TECH 1, 1-2 (Sept. 18, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/09/
18/silicon-valley-wants-high-skilled-immigration-on-campaign-agenda, archived at https://per
ma.cc/EPV2-HSTA; Statement o the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Govern-
ment Affairs, Securing the Border: Defining the Current Population Living in the Shadows and
Addressing Future Flows, Chamber of Commerce, 114th Cong. 3 (2015) (statement of Randel
K. Johnson, Senior Vice President of Lab., Immigration, and Emp. Benefits, U.S. Chamber of
Com.); Patrick O'Brien, John Kruse & Darlene Kruse, Gauging the Farm Sector's Sensitivity to
Immigration Reform via Changes in Labor Costs and Availability, AMER. FARM BUR. 8, 23
(2014), http://www.fb.org/files/AFBF LaborStudy-Feb2014.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/
96GR-H6BC.
1 See Comprehensive Immigration Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 113th Cong. 113-119 (2013) (statement by Janet Murguia, President and CEO, Nat'l
Council of La Raza); Executive Council, Executive Action to Protect Worker Rights, AFL-
CIO, (July 31, 2014), http://www.aflcio.org/About/Exec-CouncilI/EC-Statements/Executive-
Action-to-Protect-Worker-Rights, archived at https://perma.cc/Y43L-42FZ.
" Other ethnic communities, including Asian Americans, are also active in promoting
immigration reform. I highlight the Latinx population because of its size, electoral power, and
the resulting influence of Latinx identity groups in contemporary immigration debates.
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migration violations with criminality)," labor market protectionism, cultural
conservatism, and nativism.19 As with other large-scale reforms, the politics
of immigration reform demand that otherwise oppositional groups - organ-
ized labor and the Chamber of Commerce, for example - find common
ground.20 And while national polls consistently have shown a majority of
Americans favor immigration reform, including a path to citizenship for the
undocumented,21 legislative efforts repeatedly have stalled, most recently in
2013. Even before the 2016 election, a generation of concerted bipartisan
efforts to reform immigration policies had failed repeatedly, and the election
makes such grand bargain reform all the more unlikely for the foreseeable
future.
In an attempt to harmonize the competing interests in immigration re-
form, and to overcome the largely values-based opposition to it, recent com-
prehensive immigration reform proposals typically have included four
components: enhanced border security and interior enforcement, reformed
agricultural and guest worker programs, revised priorities for lawful immi-
gration (particularly in Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (STEM)
fields), and pathways to legalization.2 2 Legalization entails a conversion
from undocumented status to lawful permanent residence, typically with the
opportunity to naturalize, and thus is often referred to as a pathway to citi-
zenship.23 Legalization, then, is a critical component of comprehensive im-
migration reform, but one that always must be complemented by other
programs so as to build sufficient political support.
The legacy of IRCA hangs over the current political configuration and
demands differentiation.2 4 While IRCA was itself comprehensive in design
s See, e.g., Jon Feere, The Myth of the "Otherwise Law-Abiding" Illegal Alien, CTR. FOR
IMMIGR. STUD. at 15 (2013), http://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/feere-illegal-myths.pdf, archived
at https://perma.cc/CTL9-KKCL.
" Racism and xenophobia undoubtedly animate some of the opposition to immigration
reform, and I do not discount those, particularly in light of the 2016 election and the blatant
appeals made to such attitudes by the Trump campaign. At the same time, I seek to identify
and engage what might be considered legitimate and genuinely held objections to reform.
20 See, e.g., Ashley Parker & Steven Greenhouse, Labor and Business Reach Deal on
Immigration Issue, N.Y. TIMEs, March 31, 2013, at A14.
21 See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., 65% Favor Path to Citizenship for Illegal Immi-
grants, GALLUP (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/184577/favor-path-citizenship-
illegal-immigrants.aspx, archived at https://perma.cc/ES5P-K6S2.
22 See infra note 68.
23 Although there has been some political debate as to whether legalization should
culminate in permanent residence or entail the opportunity to naturalize, most legalization
proponents advocate a pathway to citizenship. See Jones, supra note 21 ("At 80%, Democrats
overwhelmingly favor allowing illegal immigrants to stay in the U.S. and to have an opportu-
nity to become citizens.").
S24See, e.g., Philip E. Wolgin, The Top 5 Reasons Why Immigration Reform in 2013 Is
Different Than in 1986, CTR. FOR AM. PROGREss (June 12, 2013), https://www.american-
progress.org/issues/immigration/news/2013/06/12/66208/the-top-5-reasons-why-immigration-
reform-in-2013-is-different-than-in-1986/, archived at https://perma.cc/SG73-PQ7N ("The
specter of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, or IRCA, has haunted every immi-
gration-reform effort over the past few decades and continues to influence the 2013 reform
debates."); Rachel L. Swarns, Failed Amnesty Legislation of 1986 Haunts the Current Immi-
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- including enforcement, guest worker, and legalization components -
and succeeded in legalizing approximately 2.6 million people,2 5 it is fre-
quently characterized as having failed in many of its ambitions.2 6 For over a
decade, IRCA has been denigrated as amnesty, a term meant to denote a
something-for-nothing giveaway. The political memory of IRCA is so bitter
that legalization proponents have been at pains to avoid the amnesty moni-
ker, and opponents have suspected an amnesty lurking behind every legali-
zation proposal. The term "earned legalization," and subsequently "earned
citizenship," emerged as a naming device and a substantive programmatic
structure designed to defeat the amnesty claim.27
Passed in 1986 and signed by President Reagan, IRCA was the culmi-
nation of a series of legislative efforts to enact legislation to address the
problem of illegal immigration that began with a plan submitted to Congress
by President Carter in 1977. The legislation built upon recommendations
made in 1981 by a congressionally appointed Select Commission on Immi-
gration and Refugee Policy, 28 whose principal objective was to reduce illegal
immigration. Although it also included agricultural and guest worker pro-
grams, the core of IRCA was a "three-legged stool" featuring increased bor-
der and interior enforcement, a new regime of sanctions for employers who
knowingly hire undocumented workers, and a general legalization pro-
gram.29 Legalization sought to solve the existing undocumented problem,
employer sanctions were intended to dry up demand for undocumented la-
bor, and increased border and interior enforcement was supposed to provide
the state with an apparatus for detection, apprehension, and return of those
excluded from legalization and of new, would-be undocumented immi-
grants. By this account, the moral wrongs of undocumented immigration
were to be forgiven in favor of the administrative and law enforcement gains
that would result from regularization of status.
gration Bills in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2006, at A20 ("There is no denying, however,
that the 1986 amnesty has cast a long shadow over the [then-pending] legislation. It is the
invisible enemy lurking in nearly every Congressional debate, challenging and dogging even
the most eloquent champions of immigrants. These days, skeptical senators pepper their
speeches with repeated references to its failures.").
25 Nancy Rytina, IRCA Legalization Effects: Lawful Permanent Residence and Naturaliza-
tion through 2001, Exhibit 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Office of Policy and Planning, October 25, 2002), www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/pub-
lications/irca0 14int.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/P6K4-XCNF.
2 6 
See, e.g., NICHOLAS LAHAM, RONALD REAGAN AND THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION RE-
FORM 195 (2000) (describing IRCA's employer sanctions regime as "an unmitigated failure"
and noting that IRCA "failed to solve the problem of illegal immigration").
27 See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
28 For a history of the legislation, see SUSAN GONZALEZ BAKER, THE CAUTIOUS WELCOME:
THE LEGALIZATION PROGRAMS OF THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT 25-54
(1990).
2 Muzaffar Chishti, Doris Meissner & Claire Bergeron, At Its 25th Anniversary, IRCA's
Legacy Lives On, MIGRATION POL'Y INST., POLICY BEAT (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.migra-
tionpolicy.org/article/its-25th-anniversary-ircas-legacy-lives, archived at https://perma.cc/
BDX2-X54Y.
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In the immigration context, amnesty has not always been a dirty word.0
In 1984, President Reagan expressed his support for "amnesty for those who
have put down roots and lived here, even though some time back they may
have entered illegally,"" and through the course of legislative debate, legali-
zation proponents used the term unapologetically.32 This unproblematized
use of the term reflected an understanding of IRCA as grand-bargain legisla-
tion, a one-time-only wiping clean of the slate.
Exactly what constitutes "amnesty" is the subject of some debate.33 As
Linda Bosniak has written, we can understand amnesty in the immigration
context in at least three different senses: forgiveness and forgetting, adminis-
trative reset, and validation. An understanding of amnesty as forgiveness
and forgetting draws from the Greek etymology of the word (a and mnestis,
meaning non-remembrance, or oblivion).3 4 By this account, amnesty is "an
act of official forgetting."" The forgetting is total and absolute, not merely
the resolution of a charge but its legal effacement. The second understand-
ing, administrative reset, views amnesty as a pragmatic attempt to "bring the
law and actual behavior into closer alignment for purposes of effective gov-
ernance and systemic legitimacy."3 6 Finally, the validation model under-
stands amnesty as a form of freedom that follows from a "normative
reversal" of perpetrator and victim.37 By this understanding, amnesty justi-
fies the transgressions to be forgotten and implicitly indicts the conduct of
the forgiving power.
IRCA can be understood to comport with all three understandings of
amnesty, to varying degrees. First, IRCA legalization was intended not only
30 See Bryn Siegel, The Political Discourse of Amnesty in Immigration Policy, 41 AKRON
L. REV. 291, 301 n.64 (2008).
" A Reagan Legacy: Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (July 4, 2010,
2:12PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 128303672, archived at
https://perma.cc/4LWC-TEDS.
32 E.g., "Fortunately, this bill does provide amnesty, for those illegal aliens who entered
this country prior to January 1, 1982 . . 132 CONG. REC. 33213 (1986) (statement of Sen.
Moynihan).
33 As the Supreme Court noted in Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 348 (1866), "[n]either
the English law nor our laws throws [sic] great light upon the" meaning of amnesty as used in
U.S. law.
34 Linda Bosniak, Amnesty in Immigration: Forgetting, Forgiving, Freedom, 16 CRrr.
REV. INT'L. Soc. & POL. PHIL. 344, 346 (2013); see also Norman Weisman, A History and
Discussion of Amnesty, 4 COLUM. Hum. RTs. L. REv. 529, 529 (1972).
* Bosniak, supra note 34, at 346. This is consistent with ancient Greek and Roman uses
of the concept, as well as modem French understandings. As the Supreme Court rehearses in
Ex parte Garland, "[t]he Romans, too, had their amnesty, which they called Abolitio, and
which is thus defined in their law: 'Abolitio est deletio, oblivio, vel extinctio accusationis."' 71
U.S. 333, 349 (1866). The Court quotes with approval from a case from the French Court of
Cassation stating that "the object of the amnesty is to efface, completely, the past - that is to
say, to replace the amnestied in the position in which they were before the condemnation had
been incurred . . . ." Id. at 351 (quoting De Villeneuve & Carrette, vol. 1850, part 1, 672-73).
3 Bosniak, supra note 34, at 348.
37 Id. at 350. As Bosniak explains further, this reversal results because "the purported
perpetrators were actually in the right, while the government itself is at least partly culpable."
Id.
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to resolve undocumented status, but to obliterate it legally. Thus, for those
qualifying for legalization, IRCA erased their undocumented status and in
relatively short order rendered them lawful permanent residents. This ap-
proach was also consistent with the administrative reset model. IRCA was
plainly intended to start the project of immigration enforcement anew by
zeroing out the undocumented population and ensuring that a new one was
not created. As Alex Aleinikoff has written, "The claim in 1986 was that we
were going to end illegal immigration forever."" Finally, although the
claim is rarely made explicitly,3 9 one can understand IRCA legalization as an
implicit acknowledgment that the prior immigration enforcement regime
was unworkable and unfair. As President Reagan wrote in his signing state-
ment, "The legalization provisions in this act will go far to improve the lives
of a class of individuals who now must hide in the shadows, without access
to many of the benefits of a free and open society."40
Consistent with the administrative reset goal, IRCA imposed relatively
limited restrictions on legalization eligibility. 41 The general legalization pro-
gram, which benefited approximately 1.6 million people,42 was available to
those undocumented immigrants who could prove five years of continuous
8 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Administrative Law: Immigration, Amnesty, and the Rule of
Law, 2007 National Lawyers Convention of the Federalist Society, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1313,
1314 (2007-08). Even at the time this claim was being made, however, several supporters of
the legislation expressed skepticism that it would work. For example, then-Representative
Charles E. Schumer, who strongly supported the legislation stated, "The bill is a gamble, a
riverboat gamble. There is no guarantee that employer sanctions will work or that amnesty
will work. We are headed into unchartered waters." Robert Pear, President Signs Landmark
Bill on Immigration, N.Y. TIMEs (Nov. 7, 1986), http://www.nytimes.comI1986/11/07/us/pres-
ident-signs-landmark-bill-on-imnmigration.html, archived at https://perma.cc/WB8P-KYLH,
(quoting Rep. Schumer). For examples of other skeptical views even among the legislation's
advocates, see, e.g., Muzaffar Chishti & Charles Kamasaki, IRCA in Retrospect: Guideposts
for Today's Immigration Reform, MIGRATION PoL'Y INsT. ISSUE BRIEF 9 at 1-2 (Jan. 2014)
(collecting floor statements of members of Congress).
3 As Bosniak writes:
[A]mnesty supporters very rarely express the idea that amnesty rightfully emanci-
pates irregular immigrants from unjust laws or unjustified enforcement of laws -
that is, that amnesty represents a necessary repudiation of the country's border con-
trol policies which construct them as illegal - in the first instance. Nor do they
maintain that the original act of the immigrants (whether via unauthorized entry or
visa overstay) was justified. Although one occasionally sees intimations of such
views in pro-amnesty rhetoric, this is not a standard framing. Indeed, in most cases,
advocates conspicuously avoid such claims, and instead conjoin their call for am-
nesty with a commitment to a renewed enforcement of national borders.
Bosniak, supra note 34, at 352.
40 Statement on Signing S. 1200 Into Law, Immigration Reform and Control Act, 16
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1534 (Nov. 6, 1986).
41 But see SUSAN GONZALEZ BAKER, THE CAUTIOUS WELCOME: THE LEGALIZATION PRO-
GRAMS OF THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL AcT 26 (1990) ("Legalization as it
emerged in IRCA was not an 'amnesty' in the broadest sense of the term, but rather a targeted
program that balanced the offer of legalization with stringent requirements.").
42 Rytina, supra note 25, Exhibit 1. A legalization program for agricultural workers bene-
fited approximately I million additional people.
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residence prior to January 1, 198243; paid a $185 filing fee"; and could estab-
lish they were not likely to become a public charge.45 Upon satisfaction of
these three requirements, the applicant received an 18-month temporary resi-
dence card, work authorization, and travel authorization.46 In order to ad-
vance to permanent resident status, the applicant was required to make a
modest English language/civics education program commitment within one
year of the expiration of the 18-month temporary residence period.47 Certain
exclusions also applied: applicants were ineligible for most public benefits
for a period of five years, and those with a felony conviction or three misde-
meanors were ineligible for both temporary and permanent residence.48
Despite its wipe-the-slate-clean ambitions, IRCA was the source of a
persistent undocumented population and its substantial growth in subsequent
years. At the time of IRCA's enactment, the undocumented population was
estimated at 3 to 5 million people.49 IRCA's legalization programs (both the
general legalization and one specific to agricultural workers) adjusted the
status of approximately 2.6 million people, thus reducing the undocumented
population. Following implementation of the legalization and employer
sanction programs, the undocumented population was estimated at between
.1.8 and 3 million people.0 IRCA's eligibility requirements excluded as
many as 2 million people by virtue of the cutoff date for physical presence,
and another approximately 500,000 people who were eligible but failed to
legalize. This population became "the nucleus of today's large unauthorized
population."" For much of the 1990s and 2000s, the undocumented popula-
tion grew by 5-10% per year,52 spurring exponential growth in spending on
border enforcement (under $700 million in 1986, $11.7 billion in 2012) and
overall immigration enforcement ($1.2 billion in 1986, $18 billion in
2012).53
The failure to control the undocumented population is attributable to
several flaws in the legislation: structural defects in the employer sanctions
regime, ineffective enforcement of sanctions, exclusion of immediate family
43 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2).
" Id. § 1255a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 103.7(b) (1987).
45 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(d)(2)(B)(ii)(IV).
46 Id. §§ 1255a(a) & 1255a(b)(3).
4 The statute specified that applicants either satisfy the English language and civics re-
quirements for naturalization, or that they are "satisfactorily pursuing a course of study" to
satisfy those language and civics requirements. Id. § 1255a(b)(1)(D).
48 Id. §§ 1255a(b)(2)(B)(ii) &1255a(h).
49 Michael E. Fix & Jeffrey S. Passel, Immigration and Immigrants: Setting the Record
Straight, URBAN INST. 23-24 (May 1994), http://webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
305184_inimmigrationjimmigrants.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/BZ7H-G97J.
50 
Id.
Chishti & Kamasaki, supra note 38, at 6.
52 Id. at 2.
Compare David Dixon & Julia Gelatt, Immigration Enforcement Spending Since IRCA,
6 MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (2005), with Doris Meissner et al., Immigration Enforcement in the
United States: The Rise of a Formidable Machinery, 20 MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (Jan. 2013).
Figures are in dollar terms for 1986 and 2012, respectively.
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members who did not meet the cutoff date from legalization eligibility, and
perhaps most importantly, a failure to reform the future flow of legal imni-
gration.5 4 These defects were compounded by allegations of widespread
fraudulent applications for legalization.5 Of course, the legislation alone
was not to blame; the existence of a long, geographically permeable border
separating two dramatically unequal economies makes total control of un-
documented immigration implausible." The notion that IRCA might elimi-
nate - or even control - undocumented immigration thus proved
grandiose, and left many politicians believing that they did not get the bene-
fit of the bargain; legalization was to be the price to be paid for controlling
undocumented immigration, and yet the growth of the undocumented popu-
lation only accelerated.
IRCA legalization came to be understood as a giveaway rather than a
tradeoff, and amnesty was transformed from a neutral term to a pejorative.
Legalization opponents use the term to capture a set of related objections.
First and most important is the claim that legalization rewards illegality.
This concern is objectionable in its own right, on rule-of-law grounds, but
also because it incentivizes future unauthorized migration. Relatedly, an un-
derstanding of legalization as an unjust reward constructs undocumented im-
migrants as free-riders vis-A-vis citizens and the lawful immigrant
population. Finally, elevating the status of undocumented immigrants is
viewed by some as conferring unfair advantage, to the detriment of prospec-
tive immigrants who are awaiting visas under the ordinary immigration pro-
cess. These specific complaints animate broader concerns regarding
economic competition, criminality, terrorism, and cultural preservation.
While amnesty retained its neutral connotation through the 1990s, by
2000 it was increasingly used as a derogatory term." When President
5 Chishti & Kamasaki, supra note 38, at 2-6, 9-11; see also id. at 6 n.35 (discussing how
even the family unity program created by the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649,
104 Stat. 4978, § 301 "contributed to multi-year backlogs in the family second-preference
category reserved for spouses and dependent children of lawful permanent residents");
Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment
Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 195 (arguing more broadly that employment sanctions have
"strengthened the 'jobs magnet' that [they] aimed to weaken [and] . . . encouraged illegal
immigration"); Merav Lichtenstein, Note, An Examination of Guest Worker Immigration Re-
form Policies in the United States, 5 CARDOZO PuB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 689, 694 (2007)
("While the program did offer legal status to a considerable number of undocumented mi-
grants, it was an inadequate effort by Congress to take into account what could (and ultimately
would) arise in the future: an additional, even larger flow of immigrants . . . .").
" Muzaffar Chishti, Doris Meissner & Claire Bergeron, At its 25th Anniversary, IRCA's
Legacy Lives On, MIGRATION POL'Y INsT. (Nov. 16, 2011).
56 My thanks to Stephen Legomsky for this observation.
* Bryn Siegel has demonstrated a shift in the use of amnesty in debates surrounding the
renewal of section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which allowed certain nonci-
tizens who entered without inspection to legalize status without leaving the country. Whereas
amnesty was used neutrally in debates around extension of the section in 1994 and 1997,
congressional debate regarding extension in 2000 was significantly more negative. Siegel,
supra note 30, at 301. In a news release describing its implementation of the 2000 legislation,
the Justice Department explicitly disclaimed the label of amnesty. News Release, U.S. Dep't
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George W. Bush introduced an immigration reform proposal in 2004 - an
idea he had promoted since 2001 - Congressional Republicans derided it as
amnesty.58 By the time the Senate took up comprehensive immigration re-
form legislation in 2006, amnesty was anathema. As opponents literally
sought to brand reform legislation as amnesty,59 proponents protested that
the term was inaccurate and a slur.60 Amnesty was reduced to a signifier -
or, by some accounts, a dog whistle - and thus compelled advocates to
attempt to reframe the debate.
In response to the growing toxicity of the term, reform advocates devel-
oped and propagated a counter-frame: first "earned legalization," and some-
what interchangeably, "earned citizenship." Backed by polling and focus
group data suggesting that such language made legalization more appealing
to voters - and Republican voters in particular - Democrats embraced the
language of earning.6 ' As early as 2002, then-House Minority Leader Rich-
ard Gephardt, a Democrat, introduced the Earned Legalization and Family
of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Serv.,INS Implements Section 245(i) Provision of
the LIFE Act (Mar. 23, 2001), http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/Section245iLIFEAct
032301.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/53QA-2HWU (demonstrating the need to defend the
law from attracting this label: "it is not amnesty for all persons unlawfully in the United
States"). As Siegel notes, § 245(i) was allowed to expire on April 30, 2001. Siegel, supra
note 30, at 303.
58 David D. Kirkpatrick, Republicans Squaring Off Over Bush Plan on Immigration, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 27, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/27/politics/republicans-squaring-off-
over-bush-plan-on-immigration.html, archived at https://perma.cc/NME3-E4KZ.
" As Dana Milbank wrote:
It was all fire and brimstone as House Republicans gathered yesterday in the Capitol
basement to denounce their Senate counterparts for proposing to legalize illegal
immigrants.
Rep. Steve King (R-Iowa), behind a pulpit adorned with a "Just Say No to Am-
nesty" sign, thundered: "Anybody that votes for an amnesty bill deserves to be
branded with a scarlet letter, 'A' for amnesty, and they need to pay for it at the ballot
box in November."
Dana Milbank, Opinion, The Great Senate Immigr'A'tion Debate, WASH. POST (Mar. 31,
2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/30/AR200603300
17
98.html, archived at https://perma.cc/CEP9-JEJZ. See also Editorial, It Isn't Amnesty, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2006, at A22 ("Attackers of a smart, tough Senate bill have smeared it with
the most mealy-mouthed word in the immigration glossary - amnesty - in hopes of render-
ing it politically toxic.").
' See, e.g., Milbank, supra note 59 ("'It is not amnesty,' [Senator Arlen] Specter rebut-
ted. 'This word "amnesty" is a code word. It is a code word to try to smear good-faith legisla-
tion."'); Jaime Fuller, The History of 'Amnesty' in the Immigration Debate, WASH. PosT: THE
Fix (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/11/21/when-did-
amnesty-eat-up-the-entire-immigration-debate/, archived at https://perma.cc/NS8G-Q7WF (re-
counting the political history of the term).
61 Beyond the Ballot, Immigration Reform through the Lens of Republican Primary Vot-
ers, RESURGENT REPUBLIC (Mar. 28, 2013), http://resurgentrepublic.com/research/imnmigra-
tion-reform-through-the-lens-of-republican-primary-voters, archived at https://perma.cc/
YV99-D2HP; see Scott Keeter, Where the Public Stands on Immigration Reform, PEW RES.
CTR. (Nov. 23, 2009) (reporting on polling results showing that a smaller majority supported a
'path to citizenship' objective of a comprehensive immigration bill when it was described as
'amnesty,' particularly among Republicans who "were evenly divided on the question when
the policy was described as" such).
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Unification Act,6 2 and immigration reform advocates adopted the term dur-
ing the Immigrant Worker Freedom Ride campaign in 2003.63 In response to
President Bush's guest worker proposal in 2004, Congressional Democrats
laid out principles for an "earned legalization" program," and continued to
use that language when reform legislation was introduced in 2006. It has
remained the dominant framework for legalization proposals ever since,
most notably in the 2013 bill, S. 744, which passed in the Senate but was
never taken up by the House of Representatives.65
Although earned legalization and earned citizenship were once used in-
terchangeably, by 2013 the latter term gained distinct meaning in the face of
some proposals for legalization that would culminate in a permanent lawful
status without the possibility to naturalize.66 Thus both "earned" and "ci-
tizenshp" carried weight: status was to be earned and not rewarded, and the
status would culminate in citizenship.
Just as reform proponents have claimed that amnesty is a code word, so,
too, have opponents made the same claim about earned citizenship. For op-
ponents, earned citizenship, and most any other proposal that would result in
the regularization of status for undocumented immigrants, is mere code for
amnesty.67
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE AND NORMATIVE CONTENT OF EARNED
CITIZENSHIP
The political rhetoric of earning has shaped both the substantive content
of immigration reform proposals and the normative claims underwriting
them. This Part begins with a description of the most recent earned citizen-
ship proposal, as it best illustrates the defining characteristics of such legis-
lation. In order to counter the something-for-nothing reputation of IRCA
legalization, earned citizenship is premised on the notion of exchange: immi-
grants must do something in order to merit legalization and eventual citizen-
ship. This principle of reciprocity is encoded in a legalization process that
establishes intermediate economic, civic, and cultural benchmarks that must
62 H.R. 5600, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002).
63 David Feldman, Whose Immigration Reform? Co-Optation and Resistance in the Wake
of a DREAM-Turned-Nightmare, LA REVUE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME at 4 (2013).
6 Democrats offer plan on aliens, WASH. TIMEs (Jan. 29, 2004), http://www.washington-
times.com/news/2004/jan/29/200
4 129-122045-1558r/?page= 1, archived at https://perma.cc/
58E5-J6EC.
61 See infra Section II.A.
66 See Julia Preston, A Path to Citizenship Divides Congress and, Polls Show, Confuses
Country, N.Y. Times (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/05/us/politics/ln-immi-
gration-reform-path-to-citizenship-divides-and-confuses.html, archived at https://perma.cc/
2CE2-XR75.
67 See, e.g., Sensenbrenner: Senate Bill Amounts to Amnesty, CNN (May 26, 2006), http://
www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/05/26/immigration/index.html, archived at https://perma.cc/
QDD8-ML7M ("What's going on now, in calling it a pathway to citizenship or earned legali-
zation, is not honest because it is amnesty . . . .").
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be satisfied over a number of years in order to advance from one stage of the
process to the next and ultimately to culminate in full citizenship. As the
subsequent discussion demonstrates, these substantive requirements, their
sequencing, and the system of penalty and reward that they constitute reflect
a conception of citizenship acquisition that is by turns communitarian and
assimilationist, but overwhelmingly neoliberal and penal.
A. Description: S. 744 as a Paradigm of Earned Citizenship
Although the earned citizenship rubric has been used to describe at least
five different bills over the past decade," there are several core characteris-
tics that define the framework. S. 744, the Border Security, Economic Op-
portunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, a 2013 bill that passed in the
Senate and had the President's support but was never brought to the House
floor,6 9 plainly embodies these features. The bill represents the most mature
form of earned citizenship and is the closest that such legislation has come to
passage. And while the Trump presidency has closed the window on pro-
gressive immigration reform for at least some years, S. 744 may yet serve as
a benchmark for future reform efforts should the political pendulum shift
again.
Following the three-legged architecture of IRCA, S. 744 sought to bol-
ster border security0 and interior immigration enforcement,7 ' prevent unau-
thorized employment,72 and create pathways for legalization for the large
undocumented population.73 Unlike IRCA, the bill also sought to revise sig-
nificantly the programs for lawful permanent residence and temporary, non-
agricultural worker programs. The bill contains three legalization programs
- one for agricultural workers,7 4 one for DREAMers75 and a third, general
6 S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 1639, 110th Cong. (2007); Comprehensive Immigra-
tion Reform for America's Security and Prosperity Act (CIR-ASAP) of 2009, H.R. 4321, 111th
Cong.; S. 3932, 11th Cong. (2010); S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013).
69 S. 744 - Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/I 13th-congress/senate-bill/744/actions?q=%7B%22search%22
%3A%5B%22s.+744%22%5D%7D&r=2, archived at https://perma.cc/V8JC-LLHT.
71 S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013) §§ 1101-1203.
n Id. §§ 3101-3911.
72 Id. § 3101.
7 Id. §§ 2101-2244.
74 Id. §§ 2211-21.
" Id. § 2103. DREAMers are individuals who came to the United States as children and
who seek to legalize, so named after the Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors
(DREAM) Act, itself a prototypical form of the earned citizenship regime. S. 744 incorporates
core components of the DREAM Act. Introduced periodically since 2001 - roughly contem-
poraneous with the emergence of the language of earned legalization - the DREAM Act
would provide conditional residence to individuals under age 35 who arrived in the U.S. before
the age of 16 and who have obtained a U.S. high school diploma or its equivalent. S. 1291,
107th Cong. (2002). The conditional status would be removed after six years, and lawful
permanent resident status and the opportunity to naturalize granted, if the individual completes
at least two years of post-secondary education or military service and maintains good moral
character. Id. Structurally, then, the legislation bears the hallmarks of staged incorporation of
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legalization program that is the focus of the discussion that follows. Each
program was also subject to a series of exclusions.76 Like many of its prede-
cessors, the S. 744 legalization program proposed a multi-staged' process:
from undocumented status, to Registered Provisional Immigrant (RPI) sta-
tus, to lawful permanent resident (LPR or green card) status, to citizenship.
In order to proceed from one stage to the next, an individual would have to
meet criteria that fall into four principal categories: continuous presence; the
payment of fines, fees and taxes; employment and education; and English
language and civics knowledge.
First, subject to certain exclusions7 the program would grant RPI sta-
tus to individuals who have been continuously present in the United States
for at least two years, pay a fine and application fee, and pay outstanding
federal income taxes." RPI status is renewable after six years, but only if
the undocumented into citizenship subject to satisfaction of performance metrics intended to
ensure the immigrant's productivity and contribution to society. The language of earning is
sometimes used in reference to the legislation. See, e.g., Durbin Statement on DREAM Act
And Administrative Action to Help Young Immigrants, June 15, 2012, http://www.durbin.sen
ate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin-statement-on-dream-act-and-administrative-action-to-
help-young-immigrants, archived at https://perma.cc/CSH7-SQXB (quoting Sen. Richard
Durbin, original sponsor of the DREAM Act, as saying, "For over a decade, I've been working
to pass the DREAM Act - a bill that would give these immigrant students the chance to earn
citizenship."); Luis Miranda, The Dream Act: Good For Our Economy, Good For Our Secur-
ity, Good For Our Nation, THE WruTE HOUSE (Dec. 1, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.arch
ives.gov/blog/2010/12/01/get-facts-dream-act, archived at https://perma.cc/KKS6-RE7L
(describing DREAM Act as "limited, targeted legislation that will allow only the best and
brightest young people to earn their legal status after a rigorous and lengthy process"); Ayelet
Shachar, Earned Citizenship: Property Lessons for Immigration Reform, 23 YALE J. L. &
HUMAN. 110, 143-44 (2011) (describing DREAM Act as a form of earned citizenship that
privileges rootedness as an equitable basis for legalization). However, the political narrative
around the DREAM Act differs significantly from that of general legalization proposals. In-
deed, the narrative claim of DREAM proponents is not that its beneficiaries should be allowed
to earn their citizenship, but that by virtue of their youth and upbringing, they are already
American except on paper. See, e.g., Remarks of the President in Meeting With DREAMers,
THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/04/
remarks-president-meeting-dreamers, archived at https://perma.cc/75BR-UJWT ("I don't think
there's anybody in America who's had a chance to talk to these six young people who [sic] or
the young DREAMers all across the country who wouldn't find it in their heart to say these
kids are Americans just like us and they belong here"). The paradigmatic DREAMer is inno-
cent (i.e., has come to the United States through no fault of her own), culturally assimilated,
educationally accomplished, and career-oriented. See Elizabeth Keyes, Defining American:
The Dream Act, Immigration Reform, and Citizenship, 14 NEV. L. J. 101, 150-51 (2013). The
DREAM Act thus is an important point of reference in an understanding of earned citizenship,
but in light of the particular attributes of DREAMers, is a limited vehicle for evaluating the
earned citizenship regime.
76 See National Immigration Law Center, Analysis of Senate Immigration Reform Bill:
Title II: Immigrant Visas, (June. 23, 2013) (hereinafter "NILC, Analysis of Senate Immigration
Reform Bill"].
7 S. 744 §§ 2101-02. Grounds for ineligibility include certain criminal convictions and
inadmissibility grounds such as national security threats and terrorism involvement.
78 Id. § 2101. Continuous residence would have been required from December 31, 2011.
Id. § 2101(a) (proposing amendments to the INA, § 245B(b)(2)(A)). RPI status could be
granted within 180 days of enactment of the bill, subject to the Secretary of Homeland Secur-
ity submitting to Congress a Southern Border Fencing Strategy. Id. § 5. Applicants would be
required to pay a $1000 fine and an application fee, to be set "at a level that is sufficient to
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the individual can demonstrate the satisfaction of certain employment, in-
come and education requirements, the payment of taxes, an application fee,
and a penalty.79 Renewal is necessary in order to progress because only
upon ten years of RPI status may an individual transition from RPI to LPR
status. The transition to LPR status also requires that the individual has
maintained continuous presence in the country; pays an additional penalty,
additional application fees and tax liabilities; once again satisfies employ-
ment, income and educational requirements; meets English language and
U.S. civics education requirements; and does not otherwise become inadmis-
sible by committing a crime or engaging in other prohibited conduct.0 Fi-
nally, after three years in LPR status, the individual may apply for U.S.
citizenship according to the ordinary requirements of naturalization." Thus,
there are four distinct stages at which an applicant must satisfy certain sub-
stantive standards: initial RPI application; RPI renewal; adjustment from
RPI to LPR status; and naturalization.
The employment, income, education, English-language, and civics re-
quirements necessary to transition from RPI to LPR status form the core of
the earned citizenship regime and as such are worthy of further description.
First, in order to renew RPI status, an immigrant must demonstrate that she
is regularly employed throughout the 10-year RPI period, without a period
of unemployment of more than 60 days;82 or that she has an income or re-
sources of at least 125% of the federal poverty level;"3 or that she is enrolled
in secondary or higher education or certain other educational programs.8 4
Second, upon ten years in RPI status, an RPI seeking to adjust to LPR status
must demonstrate that she continues to satisfy those same employment, in-
come and educational requirements, and in addition, must either satisfy the
English language requirements currently necessary for naturalization or be
enrolled in a course of study to achieve sufficient knowledge of English and
U.S. history and government required for naturalization."
While this structure and content bear some similarity to IRCA legaliza-
tion - that, too, had a provisional status prior to lawful permanent residence
and requirements relating to continuous presence, language, education, and
recover the full costs of processing the application." Id. § 2101(a) (proposing amendments to
the INA, §245B(c)(10)(A)(ii)). Tax liability would be limited to actually assessed federal
taxes. Id. (proposing amendments to the INA, § 245B (c)(2)(B)).
* Id. § 2101(a) (proposing amendments to the INA, § 245B(c)(9)).
"Id. § 2102(a) (proposing amendments to the INA, § 245C(b)). The transition from RPI
to LPR status would require payment of another $1000 fine and an application fee, to be set at
a level that is sufficient to recover the processing costs. Id. § 2102(a) (proposing amendments
to the INA, § 245C(c)(5)).
"' Id. § 2101(a) (proposing amendments to the INA, § 245B(c)).
82 Id. § 2 101(a) (proposing amendments to the INA, § 245B(c)(9)(B)). The individual
must also demonstrate that she is not likely to become a public charge as defined in INA
§ 212(a)(4). Id.
8 Id. § 2102(a) (proposing amendments to the INA, § 245C(b)(3)(A)(ii)).
8 Id. The bill provides a range of waivers and exceptions to the employment requirement.
Id. § 2102(a) (proposing amendments to the INA, § 245C(b)(3)(E)).
s Id. § 2102(a) (proposing amendments to the INA, § 245C(b)(4)).
276
Beyond Earned Citizenship
fees - the statutes differ in several respects. First, whereas IRCA's eligibil-
ity requirements were nearly all retrospective, a key feature of S. 744, and
earned citizenship more generally, is prospective performance. Second, pro-
visional status under IRCA was for a relatively short duration (18 months)"6
and largely administrative; its purpose was to quickly register all those who
satisfied the initial residency requirement for legalization and to channel
them into what would be a bureaucratically more complex application pro-
cess. In contrast, the provisional status under S. 744 is a minimum of ten
years, and does not merely serve the administrative registration function, but
introduces a lengthy period of probationary status. Third, the substantive
requirements that must be met in order to transition out of RPI status and
into lawful permanent residence are far more significant: although IRCA had
similar English language and civics requirements, it contained no employ-
ment or higher education obligations. Finally, although IRCA legalization
required the payment of a fee, earned legalization requires both fees and
penalties, the latter often coupled with an explicit acknowledgment that the
applicant has violated U.S. law.8 7 Relatedly, only S. 744 requires the pay-
ment of all outstanding, assessed federal tax liability, as well as payment of
taxes during the RPI status.
Critically, a failure to meet the requirements necessary to advance from
one stage to the next may leave the immigrant in a precarious status and may
subject her to removal. For example, failure to meet the requirements neces-
sary to renew RPI status would deprive the immigrant of lawful status. An
immigrant who meets the renewal requirements but is unable to satisfy the
additional obligations necessary to adjust to LPR status would be able to
continue renewing RPI status, but only so long as she continued to meet the
renewal requirements; by virtue of the work requirements, such an individ-
ual would effectively become part of a guest worker program, susceptible to
removal whenever she should cease to meet the employment requirements
for RPI renewal. Prolonged precarity thus is an essential feature of the
earned citizenship regime.
Some but not all of the requirements of earned citizenship are recogniz-
able from other citizenship practices. For example, the assimilationist re-
quirements (regarding English language and U.S. civics) are equivalent in
substance, although accelerated in time, to the requirements for naturaliza-
tion and can be plausibly defended on the grounds of national cohesion and
democratic participation." It is reasonable to assume that those either born
86 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(b)(1)(A).
" See Marc R. Rosenblum, Randy Capps & Serena Yi-Ying Lin, Earned Legalization:
Effects of Proposed Requirements on Unauthorized Men, Women, and Children, 2-3, MIGRA-
TION POL'Y INsT., (Jan. 2011), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/earned-legalization-ef-
fects-proposed-requirements-unauthorized-men-women-and-children, archived at https://per
ma.cc/U5MR-XNYA.
" See Peter J. Spiro, Questioning Barriers to Naturalization, 13 GEO. L.J. 479, 480 (1999)
(identifying two defenses to naturalization requirements - "'broad assimilationism,' under
which naturalization barriers serve to protect and maintain cohesion within the national com-
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in the United States or to U.S. citizens are likely to be assimilated into the
cultural and civic aspects of American life by virtue of their upbringing and
thus to exclude such children from having to demonstrate that they have
done so.8 Likewise, a duration of residency requirement is inoffensive so
long as it is not unduly long, as it may serve as a reasonable measure of
attachment to the nation-state.90 Such a metric is familiar to statutory provi-
sions for jus sanguinis citizenship,9' and may be unnecessary for jus soli
citizens because most will live where they are born. In contrast, the work
and penalty provisions reflect considerations unique to legalization of un-
documented immigrants, and find no analogue, implicit or explicit, in pre-
vailing citizenship practices.
B. Competing Ideologies of Earned Citizenship
A closer examination of the substantive requirements of S. 744 illumi-
nates a set of competing ideologies - neoliberal,92 communitarian, assimila-
tionist, and penal - that underwrite earned citizenship. Taken together,
these illustrate how earned citizenship not only shifts the political framing of
the legalization debate, but premises legalization on a normative conception
of the idealized citizen.
munity; and 'political assimilationism,' under which naturalization preserves the basic integrity
of American democracy" - and arguing that current naturalization requirements are unneces-
sary to satisfy either).
" For children born outside the U.S. or its territories to a U.S citizen parent or parents, the
INA imposes various parental residency prerequisites in order for the child to derive citizen-
ship. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401. Prior versions of the statute imposed residential conditions subse-
quent on the child. These restrictions on jus sanguinis citizenship have survived due process
challenges on the grounds that Congress has legitimate interests in discouraging dual national-
ity, and residency requirements are a reasonable proxy for electing nationality. See, e.g., Rog-
ers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 831-33 (1971). Insofar as parental residency may serve as a proxy
for embrace of American civic and cultural values, such requirements may also provide the
basis for presuming acculturation on the part of children born abroad to U.S. citizen parents.
90 For a discussion of time as a proxy for belonging, see JOSEPH CARENS, THE ETmcs OF
IMMIGRATION 152-54 (2013); Linda Bosniak, Response to the Case for Amnesty, BOSTON
REV., (May 1, 2009), http://www.bostonreview.net/forunmcase-amnesty/basic-rights-short-
term-imniigrants-also-need-protection-linda-bosniak, archived at https://perma.cc/UMF9-8W
BE.
9 For example, citizenship by birth is conferred upon a person born outside the United
States and its outlying possessions to two U.S. citizen parents so long as one parent has had a
residence in the U.S. or an outlying possession prior to the child's birth. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c).
Similarly, citizenship by birth is conferred on a person born outside the United States to par-
ents only one of whom is a citizen of the United States if that citizen parent has been physi-
cally present in the United States or an outlying possession for a continuous period of one year
prior to the birth of the child. Id. at § 1401(e).
92 I acknowledge the imprecision of the concept of neoliberalism and use it advisedly. See
Grewal & Purdy, supra note 1, at 2 ("Alongside diverse academic uses of neoliberalism, polit-
ical leaders and social movements deploy the term variously in concrete struggles in different
national settings. . . . We gladly acknowledge that neoliberalism is not conceptually neat and
cannot be defined by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for its use .... ").
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1. Neoliberalism and Work as the Measure of Worthiness
At the core of earned citizenship is the long period of provisional status
and the work, education, civics, and English-language requirements neces-
sary to obtain permanent lawful status. Such a contractualism is a familiar
feature of neoliberalism,93 all the more evident from the prominence of eco-
nonic earning in the earned citizenship rubric. By virtue of the work re-
quirements (for which education is an acceptable alternative), earned
citizenship heavily weights economic performance in its worthiness
calculus. As discussed above, provisional status is tantamount to a guest
worker program with a pathway to citizenship. The requirement for egular
and gainful employment of the undocumented immigrant is complemented
by the obligation that she not be subject to the public charge ground of inad-
missibility - that is, that she not require public assistance.94 Relatedly, the
provisional status immigrant is excluded from nearly all forms of social wel-
fare, including health care under the Affordable Care Act. Taken together,
these features of earned citizenship posit economic self-sufficiency as a
moral value establishing worthiness. The requirements that the provisional
status immigrant satisfy her tax obligations and not become inadmissible on
crime-related grounds further reinforce a neoliberal expectation of individual
responsibility and economic and social self-regulation.95 The immigrant
who successfully earns her citizenship thus matches neoliberalism's "under-
lying moral image of the individual [a]s one of the autonomous, free, ra-
tional and self-regulating citizen[s] who disciplines her/his nature under the
influence of the civilization processes s/he underwent."96 In this regard,
then, earned citizenship's pathway to citizenship is a pathway to neoliberal
belonging.
The focus on economic performance may be understandable given that
the undocumented population is principally the product of labor migration,
and an economic conception of immigration features prominently through-
out the American system; many permanent and temporary visa categories
9 See ANNE MCNEVIN, CONTESTING CITIZENSHIP: IRREGULAR MIGRANTS AND NEW FRON-
TIERS OF THE POLITICAL 61 (2011) (observing that according to neoliberal reasoning, "[slocial
and political relations are conceived less in terms of common civic endeavors and more in
terms of contractual relations on the basis of market exchange."); NIKOLAS ROSE, POWERS OF
FREEDOM: REFRAMING POLITICAL THOUGHT 165 (1999); Friso van Houdt et al., Neoliberal
Communitarian Citizenship: Current Trends Towards 'Earned Citizenship' in the United King-
dom, France and the Netherlands, 26 INTL. Soc. 408, 412 (2011).
94 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (rendering inadmissible any noncitizen "likely at any time to
become a public charge"). While the requirement that one not be likely to become a public
charge is properly understood as a requirement for economic performance, the work require-
ments of S. 744 far exceed the threshold requirement to be free of need for public assistance.
" See AIHWA ONG, NEOLIBERALISM As EXCEPTION: MUTATIONS IN CITIZENSHIP AND Sov-
EREIGNTY 11 (2006) ("[N]eoliberal reasoning is based on both economic (efficiency) and
ethical (self-responsibility) claims.").
96 van Houdt et al., supra note 93, at 411 (citing MITCHELL M. DEAN, GOVERNMENTALITY:
POWER AND RULE IN MODERN SOCIETY (1999)).
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are based upon employment and subject to some evaluation, however imper-
fect, of labor market needs.9 7 But legalization has never previously been
based upon individual economic performance (even as economic arguments
have been made about the overall effect of large-scale legalization)." More-
over, the earned citizenship regime does not credit past economic contribu-
tion or recognize the structural nature of migrant labor as a feature of the
late-capitalist American economy. Rather, earned citizenship requires that
the worker-immigrant clock in as if for the first time and establish not her
identity as a laborer, but her neoliberal bona fides.99
Aversion to the charge of amnesty provides a historical explanation for
why contemporary legalization proposals look different than IRCA, but it
does not provide an ideological account of the turn to either economic per-
formance or individualized earning. Instead, the conditioning of social ben-
efits upon individualized demonstration of one's worthiness, particularly in
the workplace, finds a recent antecedent in federal welfare reform. Indeed,
the neoliberal citizen projected by the requirements of earned citizenship
bears a striking resemblance to the citizen imagined by the welfare-to-work
requirements adopted by Congress in 1996,100 and earned citizenship bor-
rows heavily from the same ideological underpinnings and programmatic
structure of welfare reform. A comparison of the two further illuminates the
deep structure of earned citizenship.
Welfare, work, and worthiness long have been inextricably linked. As
Joel Handler and Yeheskel Hasenfeld have demonstrated, competing norms
of labor market regulation, charity, ideological commitments to work, and
traditionally gendered family structure'0' animate welfare policy such that it
is "a policy about morality" that hinges upon a distinction between the wor-
thy and unworthy poor.102 Those who are worthy are excused from work and
provided public assistance, while those deemed unworthy are either denied
9 See Demetrios G. Papademetriou et al., Aligning Temporary Immigration Visas with US
Labor Market Needs: The Case for a New System of Provisional Visas, MIGRATION PoL'Y INST.
6 (July 2009) ("The United States has a demand-driven, employer-led labor market immigra-
tion system."). The vast majority of lawful permanent migration is family-based. Annually,
there are 480,000 visas available for family based immigrants. WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R43145, U.S. FAMILY-BASED IMMIGRATION POLICY 3 (2014).
9 See, e.g., Robert Lynch & Patrick Oakfoard, The Economic Effects of Granting Legal
Status and Citizenship to Undocumented Immigrants, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 20,
2013).
9 There are countervailing practical reasons for not crediting past employment, as previ-
ous legalization bills would have done. In particular, applicants may have difficulty obtaining
necessary proof of past, unauthorized employment, and the government may have concerns
about fraudulent records, particularly for periods far in the past.
" See generally The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended primarily in scattered
sections of 7 and 42 U.S.C.).
101 HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 12, at 17-29.
102 Id. at 8; see also Joel Handler, What is Welfare Policy?, TIDSKRIFr FOR RArrssocio-
LOGI 6(3) at 220 (1989) ("The deserving poor possess attributes that could readily justify
public protection and care without challenging dominant cultural, economic, and political
norms. The undeserving poor, mostly the able-bodied, are those whose behavior and attributes
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aid or have that aid conditioned upon participation in the labor market. Fail-
ure of the able-bodied to work is deemed a moral failure rather than a mate-
rial one. Work thus becomes the currency of worth, and the imposition of
work requirements on welfare recipients serves to reinforce moral and ideo-
logical claims of the dominant society.03
Work requirements have been a part of welfare policy since the 1960s,
but they came to predominate in the 1990s. As the moral debate over wel-
fare, dependency, and family structure intensified from the 1960s through
the 1980s, and the figure of the undeserving welfare recipient - a black,
single mother gaming the system (Reagan's "welfare queen")'0 - took
hold among a white middle class, work requirements increasingly became
the preferred policy tool for adjudging worthiness. This culminated in 1996,
when the main federal assistance program for families, Aid to Families with
Dependent Children ("AFDC"), ceased to operate as an entitlement and was
replaced with Temporary Aid to Needy Families ("TANF"), a time-limited
program in which aid is conditioned upon satisfaction of work require-
ments.05 While other aspects of the federal welfare reform law aim to pro-
mote marriage (and therefore reduce out-of-wedlock birth) and strengthen
child support obligations of fathers, the primary ideological and program-
matic feature of the law was work.06 TANF eviscerated the promise of
baseline subsistence as a social right, as weakly expressed as that promise
was in the form of AFDC. Instead of offering class-wide financial support
on the basis of categorical eligibility criteria, TANF created a performance-
based system for establishing individual moral worth. The catchphrase for
reform, "welfare to work," 0 7 captured the notion of a pathway not only
from poverty to self-sufficiency, but from moral failure to social respectabil-
ity. Work was both the method and the goal, a process and an identity. The
goal and the identity were full and unstigmatized membership in society -
in other words, citizenship.
The figure of the neoliberal citizen is plain in welfare reform. Each
individual head of household must demonstrate her ability to self-regulate;
the state largely withdraws its support from the individual and the family, in
challenge those norms. Much of the history of public relief and welfare can be seen as cyclical
attempts to draw boundaries between the worthy poor and the pauper." (citations omitted)).
103 HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 12, at 15-16 ("The distinction between the 'de-
serving' poor and the 'undeserving' poor is a moral issue; it affirms the value of the dominant
society by stigmatizing the outcasts.").
"m See Paul Krugman, Opinion, Republicans and Race, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2007), http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/opinion/19krugman.html?_r=0, archived at https://perma.cc/
RVH3-GPCA.
o' The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act § 103, Pub. L.
No. 104-193 ("This part shall not be interpreted to entitle any individual or family to assis-
tance under any State program funded under this part.").




See, e.g., ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 241 (Stephen
Haymes, et al. eds., 2015) (describing TANF as "the centerpiece of the 'welfare-to-work' phi-
losophy toward social welfare").
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favor of the market; and market-based performance is understood not only to
provide economic support, but to cure moral defect. Work is rendered not
merely economically significant but morally transformative, and because it
is time-limited, the period of public assistance becomes transitional. The
shiftless welfare recipient is rendered economically productive and morally
upstanding. In exchange for her labor, stigma is lifted and the welfare recip-
ient moves from the margins to the center of society.
As Joel Handler has observed, welfare-to-work programs reverse the
logic of T.H. Marshall's liberal conception of social citizenship.0 In Mar-
shall's classic formulation, social rights represent the triumph of status over
contract as a baseline of protection such that support is granted by the state
to its citizens rather than by employers to its workers.109 As a historical
matter, Marshall argued, the acquisition of rights was staged, beginning with
civil rights, proceeding to political rights, and culminating with social
rights.n0 By this account, citizenship is "a device of societal integration""'
in which individuals participate merely by virtue of their citizenship. As
Marshall wrote, "social rights imply an absolute right to a certain standard
of civilisation which is conditional only on the discharge of the general du-
ties of citizenship. Their content does not depend on the economic value of
the individual claimant."12 By conditioning social welfare eligibility on in-
dividual performance as welfare-to-work programs do, social citizenship
flows "from status to contract," " turning on its head Marshall's supposition
that the content of social rights is independent of individual economic contri-
bution. Achieving social citizenship is "an obligation, not a right; an effort
of the individual, not of society."ll4
Just as welfare-to-work replaced a system of unconditional support pre-
mised upon a commitment to social rights with a rubric of conditional relief
based on individual performance, so, too, does earned citizenship represent a
turn from citizenship as status to citizenship as contract. In both instances,
citizenship - whether social or juridical - must be earned, and the earn-
ings structure is market-based and full of exclusionary potential; ostensibly a
framework for social inclusion, each system excludes those who fail to sat-
isfy performance standards.
Earned citizenship is hardly the first time that immigration and welfare
policy have intersected. Long before the emergence of the welfare state,
U.S. immigration law has been an instrument of class regulation. Gerald
"o JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP AND WORKFARE IN THE UNITED STATES AND
WESTERN EUROPE 209 (2004).
.. See T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS 154 (1950).
"o Id. at 149. For criticisms of Marshall's understanding of citizenship, see Lawrence M.
Mead, Citizenship and Social Policy: TH. Marshall and Poverty, 14 Soc. PHIL. & POL. 197,
200-03 (1997).
" CHRISTIAN JOPPKE, CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION, vi (2010).
12 MARSHALL, supra note 109, at 152.
1 HANDLER, supra note 108, at 2.
" JoPPKE, supra note 111, at 79.
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Neuman has written, "Perhaps the most fundamental function of immigra-
tion law has been to impede the movement of the poor."" Since 1882,
federal immigration law has excluded from admission individuals deemed
likely to become a "public charge,"l6 but the exclusion of immigrants -
including lawfully admitted immigrants - from welfare benefits has be-
come a special preoccupation since the 1990s. Beginning with California's
Proposition 187, which sought to exclude undocumented immigrants from
education," welfare, and other public services, the trope of welfare-consum-
ing immigrants imposing an unfair burden on states gained prominence
through much of the decade."' In 1996, the same year that Congress en-
acted federal welfare reform, it excluded legal immigrants from most public
benefits for a period of five years - the same period of time that lawful
permanent resident status must be maintained in order to naturalize.'"'
The earned citizenship regime of S. 744 extends this form of social
exclusion. The bill would exclude individuals from eligibility for most pub-
lic benefits until they either accrue five years of lawful permanent residence
status or become U.S. citizens; they are ineligible for the duration of their
time in provisional status. Thus, the exclusionary period would run for a
minimum of thirteen years. The Affordable Care Act deviates from this
model in some respects. For example, legal immigrants qualify for market-
place insurance without the five-year waiting period, but the five-year bar
continues to apply to those who might otherwise benefit from Medicaid ex-
pansion.20 With respect to undocumented immigrants, the model is undis-
"' GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND
FUNDAMENTAL LAW 23 (1996).
"6 See Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigra-
tion Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 1509, 1520 (1995). Prior to the
federalization of immigration law, states often excluded or removed "foreign paupers." See
Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM.
L. REV. 1833, 1847-59 (1993).
"7 The educational exclusion of Proposition 187 was intended as a direct challenge to
Plyler v. Doe. See, e.g., Phillip J. Cooper, Plyler at the Core: Understanding the Proposition
187 Challenge, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 64, 64 ("[T]here is no question that Proposition
187, at its core, was a direct challenge to Plyler v. Doe .... .").
"' See generally Daniel J. Tichenor, Splitting the Coalition: The Political Perils and Op-
portunities of Immigration Reform, in BUILDING COALITIONS, MAKING POLICY: THE PoLITICS
OF THE CLINTON, BUSH, AND OBAMA PRESIDENCIES 75 (MARTIN A. LEVIN et al., eds., 2012).
119 See Personal Responsibility in Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act § 403, Pub. L.
No. 104-193; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility (IIRIRA) Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 506-10, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 18, 20, 22, 28, 32, 42, 48, and 50 U.S.C.) (amending PWRORA to require proof
of citizenship for applying for public benefits and setting perimeters for discontinuing public
benefits for noncitizens who were already receiving public benefits). Unlike earned citizen-
ship, which privileges economic performance over status, the 1996 exclusion arguably was in
keeping with Marshall's description of the historical evolution of citizenship and rights, as it
allowed immigrants to secure social rights only at the moment that political rights - voting -
become available. See MARSHALL, supra note 109, at 152.
'
2 0 See Immigrants and the Affordable Care Act (ACA), NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW
CENTER, (rev'd Jan. 2014), https://www.nilc.org/issues/health-care/immigrantshcr/, archived at
https://perma.cc/774W-GCPL.
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turbed: they are categorically ineligible for ACA benefits, and under S. 744,
they would not become eligible until they transitioned from provisional to
lawful permanent immigrant status.121 Thus, S. 744 imposes a ten-year bar
for ACA benefits, literally doubling down on the social welfare restrictions
of the 1990s.12 2
The exclusion from social welfare programs until completion of the
provisional status period renders social rights a core component of what is to
be earned.123 Although eligibility for benefits does not technically require
naturalization, by delaying eligibility until such time as an individual is ei-
ther eligible to naturalize (in the case of public benefits programs) or on the
verge of eligibility (in the case of the ACA), these forms of noncitizen exclu-
sion effectively redefine the substantive content of citizenship itself. It fol-
lows, then, that a key technology of earned citizenship is to ensure that
citizenship itself is meaningfully differentiated from mere lawful residence.
Social welfare policy thus threatens to impoverish the noncitizen but enrich
the citizen, thereby reinforcing citizenship's central contradiction: the prom-
ise of belonging for some through the exclusion of others.12 4 Citizenship is
rendered a prize that not only must be earned, but which is deemed valuable
enough to in fact earn.
The analogy between welfare reform and immigration reform is inexact
for at least two reasons. First, the principal moral defect ascribed to welfare
recipients has always been their failure to participate in the labor market. As
such, work as curative of moral failure is congruent with this understanding
of welfare in a way that is inapposite to immigration reform. Indeed, while
stereotypes of the lazy, welfare-cheating immigrant have recurred periodi-
cally,'12 today the image of the undocumented worker (albeit one who under-
mines U.S. worker wages and workplace conditions) predominates. Second,
the understanding of citizenship at issue in each context differs; in the wel-
fare context, work offers a pathway to social citizenship, in Marshall's sense
121 See S. 744 § 2101(d)(4)(C) (2013).
122 The Trump election has jeopardized the ACA for everyone. See Maggie Haberman &
Robert Pear, Trump Tells Congress to Repeal and Replace Health Care Law 'Very Quickly,'
N.Y. TIMvEs, Jan. 10, 2017, at Al; Executive Order Minimizing the Economic Burden of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Pending Repeal, Jan. 20, 2017, https://www
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/2/executive-order-minimizing-economic-burden-pa-
tient-protection-and, archived at https://perma.cc/626B-2U39.
123 See van Houdt et al., supra note 93, at 413 (noting that in the British context, social
rights are "earmarked as rights to be earned").
124 Linda Bosniak has referred to this double-edged quality of citizenship as its "Janus-
faced" nature. See LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALmN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPO-
RARY MEMBERSHIP 99 (2008); see also Muneer I. Ahmad, Developing Citizenship, 9 ISSUES IN
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP Iss. 1, Article 9 (2014) ("By its very nature, citizenship offers the prom-
ise of inclusion through the practice of exclusion, the composition of a coherent 'us' through
the rebuffing (or expelling) of the 'them."').
125 DEBORAH J. SCHILDKRAUT, AMERICANISM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: PUBLIC
OPINION IN THE AGE OF IMMIGRATION 161 (2011) ("The image of immigrants as lazy free-
loaders featured prominently in national debates about Proposition 187 in California and about
national welfare reform . . . .").
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of that term,126 while in the immigration context, work promises juridical
citizenship. Thus, welfare reform conditions full membership for those al-
ready a part of the polity, whereas immigration reform seeks to enlarge the
circle of membership to those excluded by law. These differences notwith-
standing, one can see in both examples the construction of an individualized
process for determining the allocation of a social benefit and the use of mar-
ket value as the principal determinant of worthiness.
2. Communitarianism and Assimilation
Despite this predominantly neoliberal bent to earned citizenship, other
ideologies also animate the legalization regime. While the English language
requirements might be read into a framework of economic self-sufficiency,
they and the civics knowledge requirements more squarely advance commu-
nitarian goals of preparation for and participation in civic life in the United
States, along with assimilationist demands for a particular aesthetic of be-
longing.127 English language is understood not only to enable employment
advancement, but also to integrate the immigrant into local cultural life.'28
English language and civic knowledge are further understood to prepare the
immigrant for responsible, collective, democratic decision-making in the
form of voting, and communitarian accountability in the form of jury duty.
These practices, reserved for U.S. citizens, help to constitute democratic val-
ues as not merely a part of the national governance structure, but as features
of national identity. Knowledge of English language and American civics
serves as a proxy for an ongoing process of assimilation in which cognitive
knowledge translates to values-based commitment. Thus, the individualized
nature of earned citizenship's work requirements is complemented by re-
quirements of cultural and civic assimilation into the community. "Earning
one's citizenship then amounts to a thoroughly individualized cultural con-
version to the communitarian ideal of a nation defined by a bounded set of
values." 29
The cultural and civic assimilationist demands for citizenship acquisi-
tion are familiar in U.S. law. Indeed, the language and civics requirements
126 See MARSHALL, supra note 109.
127 Communitarianism emerged as a critique of liberalism. Whereas liberalism elevates
the self and individual rights, communitarianism privileges communities, common values, and
a shared commitment to protecting and transmitting such values through appropriate social and
political institutions. See generally AmyrAi ETzIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: THE
REINVENTION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY (1993). I use the term assimilation to denote the adop-
tion of dominant social and cultural practices as a means of incorporation into a community or
society. See generally MILTON M. GORDON, ASSIMILATION IN AMERICAN LIFE: THE ROLE OF
RAcE, RELIGION, AND NATIONAL ORIGINS (1964).
12s But see Spiro, supra note 88, at 489-501 (criticizing the English language and civics
requirements as unreasonable barriers to naturalization, neither being integral to either broad
or political assimilationist objectives).
129 Van Houdt et al., supra note 93, at 425.
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of S. 744 are essentially identical to existing naturalization requirements,"
and some version of those requirements has existed since at least 1906.131
Similarly, the Immigration and Nationality Act requires that a naturalization
applicant be "a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of
the Constitution of the United States, and well-disposed to the good order
and happiness of the United States."3 2 There is, then, some degree of path
dependency to the legal regime of earned citizenship.
Such path dependency notwithstanding, the economic performance re-
quirements that predominate earned citizenship are innovations in U.S. im-
migration law. But these, too, can be understood in assimilationist and
communitarian terms. As argued above, the principal contribution of the
work requirements of earned citizenship, and the economically productive
citizen they imagine, is itself cultural. The earned citizenship regime thus
highlights economic success as a feature of cultural assimilation, and ele-
vates economic productivity as a national value to be transmitted through
law. The more traditional requirements of cultural and civic assimilation in
S. 744 are complemented by newly articulated expectations of economic
productivity such that the neoliberal, assimilationist, and communitarian ide-
ologies converge.
3. Penalty and Rectification
Earned citizenship is also explicit in its penal goals. For example, S.
744 requires the payment of a $1000 fine in order to transition from undocu-
mented to provisional status, an additional $1000 fine to renew that status,1 33
and yet another $1000 to adjust from provisional to lawful permanent resi-
30 Subject to exceptions based on age and disability, the Immigration and Nationality Act
requires that applicants for naturalization demonstrate "an understanding of the English lan-
guage, including an ability to read, write, and speak words in ordinary usage in the English
language" and "a knowledge and understanding of the fundamentals of the history, and of the
principles and form of government, of the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1423. As the regula-
tions elaborate:
Attachment implies a depth of conviction which would lead to active support of the
Constitution. Attachment and favorable disposition relate to mental attitude, and
contemplate the exclusion from citizenship of applicants who are hostile to the basic
form of government of the United States, or who disbelieve in the principles of the
Constitution.
8 C.F.R. § 316.11(a).
131 Spiro, supra note 88, at 489.
132 8 U.S.C. § 1427. This language was added in 1795 and supplemented in the twentieth
century "with disqualifications for persons holding specific disfavored ideas," such as anarch-
ism in the 1906 Naturalization Act, advocacy for the overthrow of the U.S. government in the
Nationality Act of 1940, and Communism in the Immigration and Nationality At of 1952.
Gerald L. Neuman, Justifying U.S. Naturalization Policies, 16 IMMIGR. & NAT'LITY L. REV.
83, 100-01 (1994).
13 S. 744 § 2101(a) (proposing amendments to the INA, § 245B(b)(10)(C)).
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dent status3 4 - significant financial burdens for a principally impoverished
population.' Advocates trumpeted the penalty component of S. 744 as fur-
ther evidence that earned citizenship is not amnesty.'6
The requirement to pay fines reflects an acquiescence to the charge that
undocumented immigrants bear a moral and legal culpability for their immi-
gration status. Payment of fines begs the question of what conduct is being
sanctioned; the unstated answer is the act of unauthorized entry or overstay.
The base charge of "illegality" by reform opponents is thus implicitly con-
ceded, such that immigrants must "get right with the law," as President
Obama stated, "before they can get in line and earn their citizenship."3 7
This notion of first rectifying past unlawful conduct before benefiting from
legalization is extended in the requirement to pay assessed back taxes.
Rather than a penalty, this requirement responds to the free-rider dimension
of the amnesty charge.
Earned citizenship's lengthy provisional status period might also be un-
derstood in penal terms. The minimum ten-year period from initial registra-
tion to lawful permanent residence is effectively probationary. A
probationary period can be understood in prospective terms as a process of
graduated incorporation, as in the employment context. The five-year period
of lawful permanent residence prior to becoming eligible to naturalize fits
this understanding. But as in the criminal context, probation can also be
understood as the tail to a sentence, and as such, an element of punish-
ment.138 The requirement to meet performance standards in order to advance
from provisional to permanent status suggests that provisional status fits the
gradual incorporation model of probation. And yet, the duration of the pro-
visional status period - a minimum of ten years - coupled with the penal-
ties for non-compliance with the terms for maintenance of status, as well as
the public benefits ineligibility discussed above, suggest that the goal is ex-
13 Id. § 2102(a) (proposing amendments to the INA, § 245C(c)(5)(B)); NILC, Analysis of
Senate Immigration Reform Bill, supra note 76, at 3.
135 Sixty-four percent of the undocumented population has a family income of less than
200% of the poverty level. MIGRATION POL'Y INST., PROFILE OF THE UNAUTHORIZED POPULA-
TION: UNITED STATES, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/unauthorized-immigrant-popula-
tion/state/US, archived at https://perma.cc/KQ9Z-ACWC (estimates based on 2009-2013
American Community Survey and 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
by James Bachmeier of Temple University and Jennifer Van Hook of Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity). The federal poverty level in 2011 was $22,350 for a family of four. U.S. DEI'r OF
HEALTH AN) Hum. SERv., ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY EVALUATION, The 2011 HHS
Poverty Guidelines, http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/1 1 poverty.shtml, archived at https://perma.cc/
H5BT-FPPT.
136 See Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraits of the Undocumented Immigrant: A Dialogue, 44
GEORGIA L. REv. 65, 94 (2009) (arguing that imposition of punishment is incompatible with
amnesty).
' Remarks at American University, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1001, 1005 (July 1, 2010).
' See Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of Recid-
ivism, 104 Geo. L.J. 291, 294 (2016) (arguing that conditions of probation "(a) set[ ] stan-
dards for the conduct and character of people on probation, and (b) create[ ] an enforcement
structure to monitor and penalize probationers for acts that fall short of those standards.").
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clusionary rather than incorporative. If nothing else, the length of the provi-
sional status period reminds us once more that even as it promises a pathway
to citizenship for millions of undocumented individuals, earned citizenship
is built upon an architecture of exclusion.
C. Earned Citizenship's Faulty Epistemic Assumptions About
Undocumented Immigrants
The predominantly neoliberal bent of earned citizenship, combined
with its penal and disciplinary measures, constructs an understanding of un-
documented immigration that is conceptually flawed. Deeply motivated by
the political imperative to differentiate from amnesty, earned citizenship
nonetheless yokes itself to the logic of the legalization-is-amnesty argument
- namely, that the undocumented population is the result of individual vio-
lations of the law, and more profoundly, a moral transgression of the rule of
law. Because the moral story of earned citizenship begins with immigrants
in a deficit position - it is the fact of deficit that necessitates a regime of
earning - it has already committed to the restrictionists' epistemic under-
standings of the immigration "problem." The problem is understood as
originating in individual transgression, and therefore, as requiring a demon-
stration of individual moral worthiness. The original sin of immigration vio-
lation is atoned for through the moral test of earned citizenship. Thus, rather
than transcending the amnesty charge, earned citizenship remains trapped
within its logic.
By accepting as its starting point the restrictionists' account of the ori-
gins and nature of the immigration problem, earned citizenship suffers from
two conceptual limits. First, despite its fines, long path to citizenship, and
array of work, language, and civics requirements, most restrictionists still
equate earned citizenship with amnesty. For them, the earning contemplated
by S. 744 and similar measures is either too meager or will never be suffi-
cient to remedy the rule of law transgression. This objection is strengthened
by the overtly political goal of earned citizenship to legalize the vast major-
ity of the undocumented population. Although a regime of earning connotes
selectivity, the political success of the program in the eyes of its proponents
depends upon it being relatively permissive. And yet, the more permissive it
is, the more it fails to overcome the amnesty objection. Moreover, while
earned citizenship was constructed so as to counter the amnesty charge, its
focus on individual culpability and moral worth reinscribes a discourse of
amnesty. Earned citizenship thus is defined and delimited by the terms of its
antithesis: amnesty.
In light of the lack of political success of earned citizenship to date, one
might expect future political bargaining to render the conditions for legaliza-
tion more stringent in order to win sufficient support for passage. Earned
citizenship is a flexible and capacious framework that, through calibration of
its constituent elements, may be rendered more or less inclusionary. De-
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pending on the politics of the moment, it could be bargained either up or
down; lacking any intrinsic political valance, the very nature of the earned
citizenship rubric lends itself to such bargaining. Even in the current,
Trump-induced moment of hostility to immigration, we may expect the lan-
guage of earning and merit to shape immigration discourse, but for the earn-
ings levels to be set so high as to be fundamentally exclusionary.'3 9
The second limit concerns the source and nature of the large undocu-
mented population in the United States. By relying upon a regime of indi-
vidual merit, earned citizenship tacitly accepts the restrictionists' claim that
the undocumented population is the result of millions of individual decisions
to disregard U.S. law. Echoing the social construction of welfare recipients,
this is a pathological understanding of undocumented immigration: undocu-
mented immigration is the product of the moral failings of those who entered
without inspection or overstayed their visas. Earned citizenship promises to
redeem those moral failings through a neoliberal program of moral worthi-
ness: fines, work, self-reliance, education, and assimilation. But it is naive
to understand the creation of the undocumented population as the aggrega-
tion of so many individual moral failings. Such an "individual responsibil-
ity" approach ignores the structural features of migration and unfairly
allocates the entirety of the moral burden for undocumented immigration to
immigrants themselves.
A more accurate appraisal would take account of the historical and con-
temporary practices that have produced the category of undocumented immi-
grant and the large, contemporary undocumented population. Far from an
organic social category, undocumented status, or illegality, is a legal con-
struction with its origins in racial exclusion.140 As Hiroshi Motomura, Ste-
phen Legomsky, and others have described, illegality has been constructed
through a history of racial restriction on lawful immigration, employment-
based immigration preferences that have failed to meet employer demands
for low-skilled labor, and government acquiescence to large-scaled undocu-
mented labor through selective enforcement.141 "In short, unauthorized mi-
gration to the United States is a story of labor and race, and of de facto
government policy that tolerates and acquiesces in unauthorized migra-
tion." 42 The moral story is further complicated by the role the United States
139 There is some evidence that a language of earning has already been co-opted by the
new president. See Julianne Hing, How Donald Trump Will Make America White Again, NA-
TION (Jan 4. 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-donald-trump-will-make-america-
white-again/, archived at https://perma.cc/CW4R-TVTF (relating Trump's calls for a "merit-
based" immigration system to restrictionists' proposals for immigration reform).
1
40 See generally MAI M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING
OF MODERN AMERICA (2004).
141 See generally HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUT1aDE THE LAW (2014); see also
Legomsky, supra note 136, at 97.
142 Hiroshi Motomura, Children and Parents, Innocence and Guilt, 128 HARV. L. REV. F.
137, 139 (2014-15).
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has played, in many parts of the world, in creating or contributing to condi-
tions that motivate or even compel migration.143
While there is a specificity to undocumented immigration in the United
States, the rapid growth of the population in the past two decades and the
concentration of undocumented workers in low-skilled work is emblematic
of global trends. As Saskia Sassen has convincingly demonstrated, contem-
porary unauthorized immigration is not merely the product of the exercise of
state sovereignty. Rather, it is constitutive of a system of de facto transna-
tional labor regulation, a logical and necessary companion to the deregula-
tion of capital and goods that characterizes globalization.144 "Immigration is
at least partly an outcome of the actions of the governments and major pri-
vate economic actors in receiving countries."45
One might view these arguments regarding past and present state prac-
tices as implicitly factored into earned citizenship as evident from the fact
that a legalization program is being proposed at all. By this account, earned
citizenship is a moral framework for public consumption but does not ex-
press the complete moral calculus of immigration reform. But if this is true,
it exposes a further weakness of earned citizenship. By leaving the full
moral basis for legalization unarticulated, it renders earned citizenship newly
vulnerable to suspicion as a stealth amnesty program. The incongruity be-
tween public policy and its stated rationale, of conferring citizenship solely
by dint of earning, may undermine public confidence in the measure, thus
jeopardizing not only the prospects for its legislative enactment, but its per-
ceived legitimacy assuming a bill is in fact passed. And yet, a more com-
plex causal story would render the earning rubric incongruous; if the source
of the large undocumented population is attributable to structural explana-
tion, then why should legalization turn upon individual performance of
worthiness?
In sum, earned citizenship is ideologically loaded. Significantly ne-
oliberal and penal, and inextricably linked to restrictionists' moral claims
regarding amnesty and blameworthiness, it implicitly endorses a pathologi-
cal understanding of undocumented immigration that is at odds with earned
citizenship's inclusive ambitions. But beyond these problems with earned
citizenship, a deeper problem lurks: earned citizenship imperils the moral
claims of the vast majority of people for whom citizenship is unearned.
143 Id.; see also SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 13 (1998) (re-
counting the impact of U.S. sugar subsidies on employment in Caribbean Basin countries and
subsequent increases in immigration to the United States).
1' SASKIA SASSEN, THE MOBILITY OF LABOR AND CAPITAL: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AND LABOR FLOW 126-70 (1988); see SASSEN, supra note 143, at 13 ("Large-
scale international migrations are embedded in rather complex economic, social, and ethnic
networks. They are highly conditioned and structured flows.").




The notion of earned citizenship begs the question of what constitutes
unearned citizenship. While the genealogy of the term suggests that earned
citizenship's opposite is amnesty,146 the universe of unearned citizenship is
broader than IRCA legalization. In fact, the principal methods of citizenship
acquisition in the United States and the world -jus soli and jus sanguinisl47
- are themselves forms of unearned citizenship because they derive from
nothing more than the accident of birth. S. 744 and proposals like it would
create a citizenship economy in which some must earn their citizenship
while most others obtain it by mere happenstance. While such arbitrariness
in the distribution of social goods is commonplace,148 S. 744 reinscribes it in
citizenship law. Thus, earned citizenship exposes and exacerbates the soft
underbelly of liberal citizenship practice: citizenship, the supposed ultimate
guarantor of equality, is granted through vastly unequal means.
Legalization proponents often confront a baseline question of who is
entitled to citizenship and on what basis. For restrictionists, the baseline is
effectively zero, because the moral transgression of unauthorized presence is
irredeemable. But even assuming that is true, it fails to answer the baseline
question for jus soli and jus sanguinis citizenship. In a liberal democracy,
neither inheritance nor luck should determine rights or life outcomes, and
yet, under contemporary U.S. citizenship practices, that is exactly what
happens.
This Section begins by establishing the high degree of moral arbitrari-
ness that characterizes birthright citizenship - both jus soli and jus
sanguinis - and the ways in which the earned citizenship regime exacer-
bates the problem by exposing the unearned nature of prevailing modes of
citizenship transmission. It then argues that because a citizenship regime
that encompasses both earned and unearned citizenship is morally unstable,
the introduction of earned citizenship creates strong incentives to shore up
the moral claims of jus soli and jus sanguinis citizens. This can be done in
three ways: (1) moral differentiation of earned and unearned citizens,
through the deployment of criminalization, racial contempt, and selective
attacks on birthright citizenship in the form of the anchor baby narrative; (2)
a leveling down of earned citizenship, which would selectively incorporate
earning requirements into jus soli and jus sanguinis citizenship; and (3) a
leveling up, which would support abandoning the earnings regime and liber-
alizing the bases for legalization.
146 See supra notes 24-67 and accompanying text.
147 See AYELET SCHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LorrERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INE-
QUALITY 21 ("The vast majority of today's global population (97 out of every 100 people) have
acquired their political membership solely by virtue of birthplace or pedigree.").
148 Id. at 3.
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A. Moral Arbitrariness and Birthright Citizenship
Ordinarily the charge that birthright citizenship is morally arbitrary is
associated with restrictionists. Indeed, in the same moment that restriction-
ists have pressed the case that legalization of undocumented immigrants is
amnesty, they have engaged in a complementary strategy to eliminate birth-
right citizenship for the children of undocumented parents.149 Specifically,
these efforts seek to limit eligibility for jus soli citizenship (citizenship deter-
mined by the territory in which one is born) under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.5 0 The same claim of something-for-nothing undeservingness that
underwrites the amnesty charge animates the attack on birthright citizenship.
By this account, the mere accident of birth on the territory of the United
States should not result in citizenship. Rather, as several failed legislative
efforts have suggested, jus soli citizenship should be limited to the children
of citizens or lawful permanent residents.'' The Citizenship Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides, "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the state wherein they reside."'52 Such bills seek to
curtail the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment through a restrictive statutory
definition of the term "subject to the jurisdiction." A 2015 bill, for exam-
ple, would limit the meaning of the term to the children of U.S. citizens,
lawful permanent residents, or noncitizens in active service in the U.S
Armed Services, thereby excluding the children of undocumented immi-
grants (and the children of most noncitizens other than LPRs).153
If the accident of birth should not inure to the benefit of children of
undocumented parents, then why should it do so for the children of citizens?
In ethical terms, when viewed from the perspective of the child, citizenship
by birth, whether jus soli or jus sanguinis, is always an accident of birth.
The child of a U.S. citizen has done no more to deserve her citizenship than
has the child of an undocumented parent, and yet, by the restrictionists' ac-
149 See, e.g., Margaret Mikyung Lee, Birthright Citizenship Under the 14th Amendment of
Persons Born in the United States to Alien Parents, CONGR. RESEARCH SERV. 9 (Aug. 12,
2010) (recounting efforts to eliminate birthright citizenship through statutory and constitu-
tional amendment); Reform Birthright Citizenship, NUMBERS U.S.A., https://www.numbersusa
.com/solutions/reform-birthright-citizenship, archived at https://perma.cc/3R85-3ZEZ (endors-
ing legislation to limit birthright citizenship).
I Although this is often referred to as an attempt to limit birthright citizenship, that term
is overbroad, as there are two forms of citizenship acquisition at birth in U.S. law: jus soli,
which under the Fourteenth Amendment provides citizenship to those born in the United States
(subject to limited exceptions), and citizenship by descent, which by statute, subject to certain
conditions, grants citizenship to children of U.S. citizens even if they are born abroad. Com-
pare U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV § 1, with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1409. In contrast to naturalization,
these forms of citizenship acquisition operate based upon circumstances at birth. Cf 8 U.S.C.
§ 1427. As such, both may be considered forms of birthright citizenship.
'' See, e.g., Birthright Citizenship Act of 2015, H.R. 140, 114th Congr. (2015) (intro-
duced Jan. 6, 2015).
152 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV § 1.
153 Birthright Citizenship Act of 2015, H.R. 140 (introduced Jan. 6, 2015).
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count, one is worthy of citizenship while the other should be deported, pre-
sumably to a country with significantly less resources and often substantially
worse life chances. Birthright citizenship, as Ayelet Shachar has described,
is a birthright lottery.15 4 That the accident of birth should have such vast
distributive effects is, of course, contrary to basic notions of justice.5
Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith's controversial theory of citizenship by
consent provides a plausible rejoinder to this argument, and promises to res-
cue jus soli citizenship from moral arbitrariness."6 Indeed, proponents of
the bills seeking to restrict jus soli citizenship for children of undocumented
parents have frequently invoked their scholarly work."' Schuck and Smith
argued that the Citizenship Clause was premised upon a theory of reciprocal
consent between the government and the citizen. According to their argu-
ment, the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to override the Su-
preme Court's decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford,'s which denied jus soli
citizenship to African Americans, while maintaining the exclusion from jus
soli citizenship of Native Americans who remained members of their tribes,
and achieved this through the "subject to the jurisdiction" language of the
amendment.' This language, Schuck and Smith argue, reflects a theory of
citizenship based upon "a reciprocal relationship between . . . [the individ-
ual and the government] at the time of birth, in which the government con-
sented to the individual's presence and status and offered him complete
protection."6 0 Drawing on the international law scholars Vattel and
Burlamaqui, they argue that parents' consent to citizenship carries with it an
implicit demand for citizenship for their children. Thus, the government's
reciprocal consent to the parents' citizenship tacitly acknowledges the citi-
zenship of their children.'6 ' This, Schuck and Smith argue, explains how the
"subject to the jurisdiction thereof' language could sweep African Ameri-
cans within the ambit of jus soli citizenship while continuing to exclude
members of Native American tribes; by virtue of their continued member-
ship in tribes, Native Americans were not consenting to citizenship in the
United States, nor was the U.S. government consenting to their citizen-
154 SCHACHAR, supra note 147, at 4.
' See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, SOCIALISM 67 (W.D.P. Bliss ed., 1891); JOSEPH H.
CARENS, ALIENS AND CITIZENS: THE CASE FOR OPEN BORDERS 252 (1987) (describing citizen-
ship as "the modem equivalent of feudal privilege - an inherited status that greatly enhances
one's life chance."); SHACHAR, supra note 147, at 3.
'
5 6 See PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL
ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 7-8 (1985) [hereinafter "SCHUCK & SMITH, Citizenship
Without Consent"].
'" See Rogers M. Smith, Birthright Citizenship and the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868
and 2008, 11 J. CONST. L. 1329, 1332-33 (2009) [hereinafter Smith, Birthright Citizenship]
(recounting legislative attempts to limit birthright citizenship and their reliance on Schuck and
Smith's work).
15 60 U.S. 393, 396 (1857).
"9 SCHUCK & SMITH, Citizenship Without Consent, supra note 156, at 72-82.
160 Id. at 86.
1
6 1 Id. at 117-18.
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ship.162 This theory of consensual citizenship, they contend, empowers Con-
gress to define the categories of people, other than citizens and lawful
permanent residents, to whom consent to citizenship is granted.
Schuck and Smith's argument has been fiercely criticized,163 and it suf-
fers from many shortcomings. 6" The historical and interpretive accuracy of
the argument notwithstanding, consent does provide one basis for distin-
guishing the claim of jus soli citizenship of the children of citizens (and
LPRs) from that of the children of undocumented immigrants. Yet, even if
the consensual theory is operative, jus soli citizenship for the children of
citizens remains unearned.
Alternatively, it might be argued that implicit in a government's consent
to citizenship is a judgment that such citizenship is warranted. Consent to
citizenship thus may be understood not only in consensual terms, but in
terms of worthiness. By this argument, consent has been granted because of
some prior determination of the parents' desirability. Such an account would
make an earned citizenship regime for the undocumented more palatable, as
it would imply an earning requirement for all citizens. But such a strained
argument is at odds with the history of jus soli, a common law practice with
roots in feudalism.'65 As its name implies, jus soli citizenship was about
land, not individuals, and provided that any person born on a given territory
was subject to and owed allegiance to the ruler of that territory.166 In this
1
62 Id. at 80-82.
163 See generally, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Back to Dred Scott?, 24 SAN DIEGO. L. REV.
485 (1987); David A. Martin, Membership and Consent: Abstract or Organic?, 11 YALE J.
INTL. L. 278 (1985). For replies, see ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS
IN U.S. HISTORY 308-10 (1997); Peter H. Schuck & Rogers M. Smith, Membership and Con-
sent: Actual or Mythic? A Reply to David A. Martin, 11 YALE J. INT L. 545 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter "Schuck & Smith, Membership and Consent"] . Schuck and Smith themselves believe that
Congress has the power to narrow the scope of the Citizenship Clause, but contend that this
argument is not intended as a policy recommendation. Id. at 545. In recent years, Smith has
also suggested that the repeated failure of birthright citizenship bills may be tantamount to
consent to the children of undocumented citizens. Smith, Birthright Citizenship, supra note
157, at 1333-34.
1" For example, as Gerald Neuman has argued, the inclusion of the children of lawful
permanent residents within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment's jus soli citizenship, but
not the children of other noncitizens, rests uneasily within the consent framework given that
such status is revocable by the government. As Neuman contends, Schuck and Smith's treat-
ment of lawful permanent residents as a category to which the government has consented is
compelled less by a theory of consent and more by the landmark decision of United States v.
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898), which held that under the Citizenship Clause, a
child born to Chinese parents legally residing in San Francisco was a citizen, even though the
parents were statutorily ineligible to naturalize. Neuman, supra note 163, at 493-94. Moreo-
ver, Wong Kim Ark rejects the very consent-based notion of citizenship that Schuck and Smith
advocate. Id. at 494 (noting that the dissent embraced a consensual understanding of citizen-
ship, relying upon Vattel). Neuman and others have also argued that a more straightforward
meaning of the "subject to the jurisdiction" language of the Amendment enables the exclusion
of Native American tribes, without making recourse to a theory of consensual citizenship.
165 See Patrick Weil, Access to Citizenship: A Comparison on Twenty-Five Nationality
Laws, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES 17, 19 (T. Alexander
Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 2001).
166 SCHUCK & SMITH, Citizenship Without Consent, supra note 156, at 13-17.
Beyond Earned Citizenship
context, the ruler, and later the state, was indiscriminate as to the qualities of
the citizens it made by virtue of jus soli. Jus soli was an instrument for the
production of fealty, not the selection of good citizens.
History aside, consent is an ill-fitting proxy for earning. There are
many reasons a government might consent o citizenship, including humani-
tarianism (as in the case of refugees),'7 pragmatism (such as IRCA legaliza-
tion),'6 8 or evolving notions of justice (for example, the granting of
immigration benefits to same-sex spouses of U.S. citizens).'69 It is difficult
to assimilate these into a rubric of earning. But even if one could reduce
consent-based citizenship to a theory of earning, the earning justification
weakens over time. This is because consent-based citizenship effectively
transforms jus soli into a form of jus sanguinis citizenship (citizenship by
bloodline); under a consent-based model, the citizenship of a child depends
upon the status of the parent, and thus bloodline becomes largely dispositive
of citizenship. With each succeeding generation, the original consensual
deal between individual and government becomes ever more attenuated, and
consent-as-merit approaches consent-as-heredity. Heredity is, as Mill noted,
the antithesis of earning.170
There are, of course, legitimate grounds for jus sanguinis citizenship,
such as preventing statelessness,171 fostering normative notions of family,172
ensuring care and protection of children,173 and promoting intergenerational
development of the political community,174 not to mention mere conve-
nience. But none of these are merit-based arguments. Moreover, a regime
of jus sanguinis in the absence of jus soli citizenship tends toward ethno-
nationalism, because it entrenches the citizenship claims of those ethnic
117 Under the Refugee Act of 1980, refugees are granted a legal status that is adjustable to
lawful permanent residency after one year, from which status the individual typically may
naturalize after another five years. See 8 U.S.C. §§1159, 1427.
.6. See supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
'
69 
See IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR., MARRIAGE EQUALITY IN IMMIGRATION LAW:
IMMIGRATION BENEFITS FOR SAME-SEX MARRIED COUPLES (2013), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/
default/files/documents/marriage-equalityin-immigrationlaw_-_immigration.benefits for_
same-sex-marriedscouples.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/N9ND-C9Q6 (summarizing De-
partment of Homeland Security treatment of immigration benefit petitions filed on behalf of
same-sex spouses following the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Windsor, 133
S.Ct. 2675 (2013)).
70 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR APPLI-
CATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Book 5, Ch. 9 (1848).
"' CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MALMAN, STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, AND RONALD Y.
WADA, 7-91 IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 91.01.
172 See generally Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and
the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134 (2014).
173 See Kerry Abrams, No more blood, European Union Democracy Observatory on Citi-
zenship: CITIZENSHIP FORUM, http://eudo-citizenship.eulcommentaries/citizenship-forum/citi-
zenship-forum-cat/1389-bloodlines-and-belonging-time-to-abandon-ius-sanguinis?showall= &
start= 8, archived at https://perma.cc/AH22-DQSZ.
174 SHACHAR, supra note 147, at 21-43.
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groups already incorporated into the nation."' Jus sanguinis is status-pre-
serving rather than status-creating, and as Shachar has shown, treats citizen-
ship as a form of inheritance.'7 6 A convergence of jus soli and jus sanguinis
citizenship, as the restrictions on birthright citizenship would force, thus
sharpens the line between unearned citizenship for those already present and
a requirement of earning for those seeking admission.
B. Strategies of Moral Differentiation: Racialization, Criminalization,
and the Invention of the Anchor Baby
In a tacit recognition of the shaky moral basis for eliminating jus soli
citizenship, restrictionists have not merely decried citizenship for the chil-
dren of undocumented parents resulting from happenstance, but have in-
vented a trope of intentional moral culpability for their movement: the
anchor baby. The mythological anchor baby7 7 is the product of a devious
plan by undocumented, pregnant women who connive to enter the United
States unlawfully just in time to give birth on American soil. 7 1 Once born,
the child not only becomes a U.S. citizen but, according to the mythology,
becomes the legal and sociological basis for legalization of an entire family
- mother, father, siblings, and others. 7 The specter of a late-term pregnant
Mexican woman crossing the border in order to unfairly avail herself and her
family of the benefits of citizenship (legal status, eligibility for social wel-
fare) recalls the figure of the welfare queen used so effectively in the 1980s
and 1990s to eliminate welfare as a social entitlement.s0 In both cases, the
17s See Costica Dumbrava, Bloodlines and Belonging: Time to Abandon Jus Sanguinis?,
European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship: CITIZENSHIP FORUM, http://eudo-citi-
zenship.eu/commentaries/citizenship-forum/citizenship-forum-cat/1389-bloodlines-and-be-
longing-time-to-abandon-ius-sanguinis?showall= &limitstart=, archived at https://perma.cc/
XQF5-MNX5.
1"6 SCHACHAR, supra note 147, at 21-43.
177 See, e.g., Louis Jacobson, Fact-Checking the Claims About 'Anchor Babies' and
Whether Illegal Immigrants 'Drop and Leave', POLITIFACT.COM (Aug. 6, 2010, 6:15 PM),
www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2010/aug/06/lindsey-grahamlillegal-immigrants-
anchor-babies-birthright/, archived at https://perma.cc/E9AG-TN7Z.
7 See, e.g., Amy Davidson, The Anchor-Baby Question at the G.O.P. Debate, NEW
YORKER (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/the-anchor-baby-
question-at-the-g-o-p-debate, archived at https://perma.cc/GUY4-C9NS (recounting "anecdo-
tal and demagogic" definitions of anchor baby, including "[Donald] Trump's talk of a woman
practically in labor stumbling over the border for twenty-four hours to give birth, or accounts
of 'maternity tourism.').
"' See Allison S. Hartry, Birthright Justice: The Attack on Birthright Citizenship and Im-
migrant Women of Color, 36 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 57, 60, (2012).
"s0 See PREMILLA NADASEN, WELFARE WARRIORS: THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES 194-99, 239-40 (2005); Michele Estrin Gilman, The Return of the Wel-




trope is racialized, gendered, and criminal, as the offender cheats taxpayers
and cynically takes advantage of the nation's generosity.'"'
The invention of the anchor baby trope was necessary in order to
strengthen the moral claim for jus soli citizenship for the children of citizens
over that of the children of undocumented parents. By providing a claim to
worthiness based not on some affirmative performance, as earned citizenship
requires, but on the absence of criminality, the trope recharacterizes "acci-
dents of birth" as conspiracies to commit fraud, recapitulating the "rule of
law" claim of the restrictionists and defeating the claim of unfair treatment
of such children. Undocumented immigrants thus are charged with moral
culpability that overcomes the accident-of-birth objection.
In recent years, the anchor baby narrative has been supplemented by the
specter of terrorism. For example, restrictionists frequently seek to shore up
their calls for curtailing birthright citizenship by pointing to the case of
Anwar Al-Awlaki, the U.S. citizen believed to have become a spiritual
leader, recruiter and propagandist for Al Qaeda. Al-Awlaki, restrictionists
point out, was born to non-immigrant parents while his father was on a stu-
dent visa, and is "an example of how Birthright Citizenship has the potential
to benefit enemies of the United States."1 8 2 The case of Yaser Hamdi, cap-
tured in Afghanistan in 2001 and held as an "enemy combatant," similarly
led to calls to curtail birthright citizenship.'83 Hamdi was born in Louisiana
to Saudi parents on a temporary work visa,8 4 and his citizenship by birth
became the basis on which he was transferred out of the purgatory of Guan-
tinamo and into a military brig in South Carolina that afforded full due pro-
cess protections.'5 As in the mythological case of the border-crossing
pregnant Mexican woman, the terrorist trope's deployment of a racialized,
criminal figure both masks and attempts to fortify the moral legitimacy of
jus soli for the children of citizens.
The anchor baby trope epitomizes a maneuver enabled by the baseline
problem of birthright citizenship: moral differentiation by way of criminal-
ization and racialization, in order to save birthright citizenship from the
charge of moral arbitrariness. Defenders of jus soli citizenship have argued
"I See Peter Edelman, Welfare and the Politics of Race: Same Tune, New Lyrics?, 11 GEO
J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y 389, 389, 397-99 (2004); Keyes, supra note 75, at 150-51.
182 See, e.g., NUMBERS U.S.A., supra note 149.
183 See, e.g., Howard Sutherland, Citizen Hamdi, AMER. CONSERVATIVE (Sept. 27, 2004),
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/citizen-hamdi/, archived at https://perma.cc/
35AN-NAHU.
184 See id.
' See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) ("We hold that although Congress
authorized the detention of combatants in the narrow circumstances alleged here, due process
demands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful
opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker.").
Hamdi was eventually released from U.S. custody and sent to Saudi Arabia, where he had
grown up, on the condition that he renounce his U.S. citizenship. See Settlement Agreement,
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 2:02CV439 (E.D. Va., Sept. 17, 2004), http://news.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docs/hamdi/91704stlagrmnt.htmI, archived at https://perma.cc/939W-BWAP.
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primarily on historical grounds. They cite the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Wong Kim Ark' 6 and the role of birthright citizenship as an
essential legal feature of Reconstruction, and argue that these constitutional
protections should not be the object of political tinkering or mischief.' But
the baseline problem leaves jus soli vulnerable to pernicious, false, and nati-
vist attack.
Paradoxically, earned citizenship relies upon the same structure of
moral differentiation as do the attacks on birthright citizenship, even as one
is expansionary and the other restrictionist. As discussed previously,'
earned citizenship situates undocumented immigrants in the place of moral
deficit, implicitly crediting the restrictionists' law-breaker narrative. Of
course, earned citizenship does not traffic in the racism of the anchor baby
or terrorist tropes, but its probationary and punitive qualities reinforce the
immigrant-as-criminal narrative that restrictionists so regularly invoke.' 9
C. Leveling Down: Selective Incorporation of Earning Requirements
The imperative to buttress the moral basis of birthright citizenship
might also be met by importing behavioral requirements into jus soli and jus
sanguinis citizenship. Rather than subject only legalizing immigrants to per-
formance tests, the same could be done for citizens by birth. By this ac-
count, citizenship would be earned by all. And yet, it is far more likely that
this kind of leveling down of citizenship would be selective in its applica-
tion, and create new forms of citizenship vulnerability. Such patterns are
evident in two examples: the persistent attacks on jus soli citizenship, dis-
cussed above in relation to moral differentiation, and more recent proposals
for citizenship-stripping.
The attacks on territorial birthright citizenship effectively subject the
parents of putative jus soli citizens to a behavioral test. For example, the
186 169 U.S. 649 (1897). Wong Kim Ark involved a man born in San Francisco to Chinese
immigrants who, after leaving the country to visit his parents in China, was denied entry upon
his return under the Chinese Exclusion Act. Id. at 649. The Court held that the Citizenship
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment confers citizenship on children born in the United States
to noncitizens permanently domiciled in the country and not employed in a diplomatic or
official capacity under a foreign government. Id. at 702-03. As such, the Chinese Exclusion
Act did not apply. Id. at 699. In reaching this conclusion, the Court interpreted the "subject to
the jurisdiction thereof' language of the Citizenship Clause to mean within the political juris-
diction of the United States. Id. at 702-O5. The case constitutes the Supreme Court's fullest
explication and defense of jus soli citizenship. See generally Lucy E. Salyer, Wong Kim Ark:
The Contest Over Birthright Citizenship, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 51-85 (David A. Martin &
Peter H. Schuck, eds. 2005); see also Lucy SALYER, LAW HARSH As TIGERS 98-99 (1995);
Garrett Epps, The Citizenship Clause: A "Legislative History", 60 AMER. U. L. REv. 331,
331-34, 381 (2010).
87 See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodrfguez, The Citizenship Clause, Original Meaning, and the
Egalitarian Unity of the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 U. PENN. J. CONST!L. L. 1363, 1364-66
(2009).
88. See supra Section II.C.
89 See supra Section II.B.3.
298
2017] Beyond Earned Citizenship 299
Birthright Citizenship Act of 2015 would limit birthright citizenship to the
children of U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, or those in active mili-
tary service.190 The inclusion of military service is explicitly performance-
based, and echoes similar preferential treatment in citizenship law for those
who have served in the armed forces.19' But as evident from the anchor baby
trope, the alienage restrictions of such bills are implicitly behavioral tests;
U.S.-born children of the undocumented are excluded from citizenship be-
cause of the actions of their parents to enter or remain in the country, fraudu-
lently and criminally. Thus, the behavioral requirements to refrain from
criminal activity and to conform to a script of neoliberal self-governance,
which animate the earned citizenship framework,192 have been selectively
incorporated into jus soli citizenship and applied with racial exclusion as its
obvious goal.
If birthright bills represent a leveling down of citizenship at the front
end, then expatriation bills constitute a similar degradation at the back end.
In January 2015, Senator Ted Cruz introduced the Expatriate Terrorist Act,
which would expand the grounds on which a citizen, whether by naturaliza-
tion or by birth, may be stripped of her citizenship.1 93 The expanded grounds
include the provision of "material support" to a foreign terrorist organiza-
tion,19 4 a notoriously broad category'95 that appears in both immigration and
criminal law.1 96 In 2010, then-Senator Joseph Lieberman introduced a simi-
lar bill.' 97 Here again, citizenship is subjected to a behavioral test. Whereas
..0 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
19! For example, noncitizens who served honorably in active-duty status in the military
during periods of military hostilities are eligible to naturalize immediately. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1440(a); Exec. Order 13,269, Fed. Reg. 45,287 (Jul. 3, 2002) (designating noncitizens erv-
ing in the military on or after September 11, 2001, as eligible for immediate citizenship under
8 U.S.C. § 1440). Noncitizens serving in peacetime also qualify for naturalization on an accel-
erated basis. See 8 U.S.C. § 1439. In addition, DREAM Act proposals provide for military
service as an alternative basis to post-secondary education for obtaining lawful permanent
residence. See supra note 75.
1
9 2 See supra Section I.B.1.
193 Expatriate Terrorist Act, S. 247, 114th Cong. (2015).
1
9 4 Id.
'9 See, e.g., Opening Brief for Humanitarian Law Project at 3-4, Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2009) (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89) (describing lawful, nonviolent activity
that government charged as constituting material support). But see Holder, 561 U.S. at 18-19
(rejecting argument that 18 U.S.C. § 2339B was unconstitutionally vague or overbroad as
applied).
96 See § 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI); 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. A material support provi-
sion was eventually imported into the law governing military commissions held at GuantA-
namo Bay. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 950v(b)(28), 120
Stat. 2630 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w (2006)), http://www.loc.gov/rr/
frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/PL-109-366.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/2SH7-GUS3, replaced by
Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 950t(25) (2012); Peter Margulies, Defining,
Punishing, and Membership in the Community of Nations: Material Support and Conspiracy
Charges in Military Commissions, 36 FORDHAM INT L. L.J. 1, 57-61 (2013).
197 Terrorist Expatriation Act, S. 3327, 111th Cong. (2010). Representative Charlie Dent
introduced an identical bill in the House. See Terrorist Expatriation Act, H.R. 5237, 111th
Cong. (2010).
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 52
territorial birthright bills would condition citizenship on ex ante good behav-
ior, expatriation bills would extend the behavioral requirements ex post. In
so doing, these bills would move citizenship away from a permanent status
and toward a probationary one, not unlike the lengthy probationary period of
Registered Provisional Immigrant status under S. 744.1'9 The focus on ter-
rorism, and the disparate negative impact these expatriation bills likely
would have on citizens of Arab, Muslim, and South Asian descent,199 mirrors
the racialization of the anchor baby narrative, and once more represents a
selective application of performance metrics to citizenship. The result is to
create racially determined tiers of citizenship, an outcome that contradicts
the essential liberal purpose of citizenship as a uniform and indivisible status
of equality that transcends ascriptive difference,2 00 and undermines the con-
stitutional promise of equal citizenship to "guard[ I] against degradation or
the imposition of stigma."2 01 Moreover, these bills represent a sharp depar-
ture from modern Supreme Court jurisprudence on the law of expatriation
that has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as providing near-absolute
protection against the involuntary removal of citizenship,2 02 permitting expa-
triation only under the most stringent of circumstances.2 03
Although neither birthright citizenship nor expatriation bills have been
enacted to date, it would be a mistake to conclude from this that birthright
citizenship is forever secure against such attacks. The anchor baby trope has
helped to propel an extremist politics in the United States of a kind that has
not been seen in generations; during the 2016 campaign, Donald Trump ar-
gued that birthright citizenship was "the biggest magnet for illegal immigra-
tion," 204 and routinely inveighed against "anchor babies."2 05 Meanwhile,
'9' See supra notes 86-87, 138 and accompanying text.
19 For a discussion of the legal, cultural, social, and political practices that have helped to
shape the racial construction of the terrorist, see generally Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the
Terrorist, 49 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1575 (2002); Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-
September 11 Hate Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259 (2004).
200 See generally Muneer I. Ahmad, The Citizenship of Others, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2041
(2014);
201 Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term - Foreword: Equal Citizenship
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1977). As Karst writes:
The principle of equal citizenship presumptively insists that the organized society
treat each individual as a person, one who is worthy of respect, one who 'belongs.'
Stated negatively, the principle presumptively forbids the organized society to treat
an individual either as a member of an inferior or dependent caste or as a
nonparticipant.
Id.
202 For an outstanding history of U.S. expatriation law, see generally PATRICK WEIL, THE
SOVEREIGN CITIZEN: DENATURALIZATION AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
(2013), and Peter Spiro, Expatriating Terrorists, 82 FORDHAM L. REv. 2169 (2014).
203 See, e.g., Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967) ("Our holding does no more than
to give to this citizen that which is his own, a constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free
country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship.").





civil rights advocates have argued that the government has achieved racially
targeted expatriation through alternative means, such as overseas passport
revocations.2 06 Many European and Western countries, such as the United
Kingdom, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand, have restricted jus soli citi-
zenship in recent decades (even as Germany has expanded it),207 and several
countries, including the United Kingdom and Canada, have enacted citizen-
ship-stripping bills as part of their anti-terrorism initiatives.2 08 The American
constitutional basis for jus soli citizenship, and its inextricability from Re-
construction and a positive vision of racial equality,209 suggests that territo-
rial birthright citizenship may be more robust in the United States. At the
same time, the long history of denaturalization210 including its contemporary
forms, suggests the historical contingency of citizenship practices.
D. Leveling Up: Liberalizing the Earnings Requirements
As the previous discussion illustrates, the strategies of moral differenti-
ation and selective incorporation of earnings requirements, mitigate the
asymmetry between earned and unearned citizenship, but at significant risk
of unfounded moralizing and racial contempt of immigrants. A third ap-
proach would reduce the corrosive effect on unearned citizenship by liberal-
izing the earnings requirements for legalization, thereby ameliorating the
corrosive effect on unearned citizenship. Such an approach might abandon
the language and structure of earning entirely, so as to avoid the morally
uncomfortable and normatively unjustifiable distinction between earned and
unearned citizenship, as well as the pernicious tendencies that frequently
characterize defenses of unearned citizenship.
While one might expect different bases for citizenship acquisition as
between those territorially present at birth and other citizens on the one
205 See, e.g., Reena Flores, Donald Trump: "Anchor babies" aren't American citizens,
CBS NEWS (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-anchor-babies-
arent-american-citizens/, archived at https://perma.cc/Q37D-5QT8.
206 See generally Ramzi Kassem, Passport Revocation as Proxy Denaturalization: Exam-
ining the Yemen Cases, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2099 (2014) (describing revocation of dozens, if
not hundreds, of passports of naturalized U.S. citizens from Yemen, and placing them in con-
text of broader, racially, and religiously targeted counterterrorism practices).
207 For a summary of these developments, see generally Mae N. Ngai, Birthright Citizen-
ship and the Alien Citizen, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2521 (2007).
208 See Audrey Macklin, Citizenship Revocation, the Privilege to Have Rights and the
Production of the Alien, 40 QUEEN'S L.J. 1, 2 (2014) (comparing Canadian, British, and Amer-
ican approaches to expatriation and noting that "politicians in various states have recently
pondered citizenship stripping as a way to convert the terrorist into a foreigner").
209 See, e.g., Benny v. O'Brien, 58 N.J.L. 36, 40 (N.J. 1895) ("The Fourteenth Amend-
ment, by the language, 'all persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof,' was intended to bring all races, without distinction of color, within the rule which
prior to that time pertained to the white race."), quoted with approval by United States v.
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 692-93.
210 See WErL, supra note 202, at 1-12.
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hand, and immigrants on the other,2 11 a leveling up approach would interro-
gate and minimize those differences; the acquisition of citizenship, and not
just the terms of citizenship once obtained, should be subject to moral in-
quiry.212 If "the idea of citizenship is 'isonomy' "213 - that is, equal rights
achieved through symmetric application of law 2 14 - then this same principle
should apply to citizenship acquisition. There may be good and practical
reasons that identical rules cannot apply as between citizenship-at-birth and
subsequently acquired citizenship, but incongruity in citizenship acquisition
may taint the equality of citizenship once acquired. This is especially true
where, as in the case of earned citizenship, the path to citizenship features a
long, probationary period during which lawful status is precarious. For this
reason, such dissonance should be minimized wherever possible. The asym-
metric application of an earnings regime in the context of legalization runs
counter to this goal of equal citizenship.
Moreover, a more expansive legalization program is consistent with the
Arendtian view of citizenship as a prerequisite for securing basic rights.2 15 A
requirement to demonstrate one's worthiness for rights protection is incom-
patible with the human rights understandings of citizenship. While the exis-
tence of jus soli and jus sanguinis regimes of citizenship obviously cannot
preclude rules for naturalization,216 an understanding of citizenship as the
essential prerequisite of equality counsels that the barriers to citizenship for
those who are members of the society be kept low. Rather than relegating
immigrants to an uncertain fate for a decade or more, such a citizenship
approach would accelerate the full incorporation of immigrants into the pol-
ity so as to reduce social stigma, economic vulnerability, and insecurity as to
residence, while promoting full and meaningful social and political partici-
pation. A rapid and unencumbered path to citizenship is, then, a path to
equal citizenship.217
The difficulty with such a liberal legalization program is that even as it
mitigates the baseline problem of jus soli and jus sanguinis, it presents its
own baseline quandary: what is the source of claim for citizenship, and what
are its limits? Without answering this question, the bogeyman of open bor-
ders looms even more potently than the charge of amnesty. The earned citi-
zenship framework attempts to resolve the problem through its elaborate
system of worthiness metrics, but as discussed here, it does so at significant
cost. It is possible that earned citizenship ultimately will prove to be a polit-
211 See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
60, 165-66 (1983).
212 See SHACHAR, supra note 147, at 44-69.
213 FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 164 (1960).
214 See JoPPKE, supra note 111, at 5-6.
215 See ARENDT, supra note 10, at 267-303.
26 Congressional authority to prescribe rules of naturalization is provided for in Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution.
217 Karst, supra note 201, at 5-11.
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ically viable framework for resolving the status of the current undocumented
population, but it remains normatively unsustainable, and thus invites con-
sideration of alternative approaches to legalization.
CONCLUSION
Having so predominated the politics of immigration reform for the past
fifteen years, the earned citizenship/amnesty debate has crowded out the dis-
cursive space for alternative understandings of legalization. It is possible,
and perhaps even likely, that changing demographics and the growing elec-
toral power of Latinx voters ultimately will propel the earned citizenship
narrative to legislative success in a post-Trump era. But such a strategy
would entrench a narrative of individual moral accountability for a problem
of obviously structural dimension, create a morally unstable structure of
earned and unearned citizenship, and place unnecessary and unproductive
pressure on the shaky moral foundation for birthright citizenship. In light of
the costs of this approach, we should consider letting go of the earned citi-
zenship framework in order to open a space to imagine new moral and politi-
cal framings of immigration.
One option would be to consider the current condition of undocu-
mented immigration as a problem of caste. Over the past two decades, un-
documented immigration has become increasingly normalized. Even as the
politics around the issue have flared - most notably in the form of state and
local efforts to regulate immigration on the one hand,218 and social mobiliza-
tion in favor of legalization on the other219 - undocumented immigrants
have become a fixture in American society. And yet, the space they occupy
is, by law, marginal. The undocumented population today consists of some
11 million people, most of whom have been here for nearly a generation, are
racially marked, disproportionately poor, categorically disenfranchised, sys-
tematically discriminated against, and relegated by law to the absolute mar-
gins of the economy. These are the hallmarks of caste.
Caste is anathema to constitutional commitments to equality, and the
persistence of the large undocumented population in American society could
be understood as violating anti-caste commitments embedded in the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses.220 The creation and persistence of
218 2010 Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in the States 1, NATL CONF. OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/2010-immi-
gration-related-laws-and-resolutions-in-t.aspx, archived at https://perma.cc/UE9D-LD7Q (not-
ing that states "enacted a record number of laws and resolutions addressing immigration issues
in 2010," with nineteen states passing thirty-seven laws).
219 See Keyes, supra note 75 (describing the history of the DREAMer movement as well
as push for legalization in the 2000s).
220 Many scholars have interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment's due process protections
as having been intended to eliminate caste status. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, The Anticaste Prin-
ciple, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2436 (1994) (arguing that Reconstruction Amendments were
intended to address both discriminatory legislation and "a social status quo that, through his-
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caste thus is constitutionally and socially intolerable. As Justice Harlan
stated in his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, "There is no caste here."22'
The anti-caste principle does not resolve the question of unlawful status
that has animated the amnesty charge, but it does provide an alternative
frame for understanding the current circumstance of undocumented immi-
gration, and supplies a moral and legal imperative for action to resolve it. It
neither accedes to the individual culpability premise of restrictionists nor
attempts to resolve the complex causality of undocumented migration. In-
stead, a focus on caste forces consideration of the current realities of racial-
ized inequality. It gives substance and specificity to the amorphous claim
that legalization is consistent with American values.22 2 And it recognizes
that long-term, large-scale undocumented immigration not only diminishes
the well-being of undocumented immigrants, but degrades the principle of
equality. The maintenance of an equality regime, for the enjoyment of all
citizens, depends upon the elimination of caste. The coexistence of citizen-
ship and caste is the destruction of citizenship itself.
Undoubtedly there are yet other moral and political framings available.
Their development should be encouraged, and in a manner that recognizes
that the problem to be solved is not some conjured moral deficiency of the
undocumented, but a collective responsibility for our societal well-being.
torical and current practices, creates second class status"); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the
Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHL. & PUB. AFw. 107, 150-51 (1976) (arguing that a "group-
disadvantaging principle" of the Equal Protection Clause espouses "an ethical view against
caste, one that would make it undesirable for any social group to occupy a position of subordi-
nation for any extended period of time."); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 16-21, at 1515 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the "antisubjugation principle, which aims to
break down legally created or legally reinforced systems of subordination that treat some peo-
ple as second-class citizens"); see also William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizen-
ship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 7-15 (1999) (discussing various liberal constitutionalists' theories of
caste); see generally Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONsT.
COMMENT 257 (1996); Karst, supra note 201; Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968
Term - Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L.
REv. 1 (1969). For a discussion of the Citizenship Clause interpreted in accord with the anti-
caste principle, see generally Rodrfguez, supra note 187, at 1365. Although these arguments
address only Fourteenth Amendment equal protection, they may be applied by analogy to the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.
221 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
222 See, e.g., Mary Giovagnoli, Overhauling Immigration Law: A Brief History and Basic
Principles of Reform, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/perspec-
tives/overhauling-immigration-law-brief-history-and-basic-principles-reform, archived at
https://perma.cc/4XTD-7X86 (arguing that path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants is
one of basic principles for immigration reform that supports American values).
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